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ARTICLES 
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AS SIGNALING 
AND CO-OPTATION 
Roy Shapira*
 
 
This Article provides a new perspective on corporate philanthropy by 
examining a previously unnoticed mechanism through which corporate pro-
sociality enhances firm value:  signaling.  In particular, cash donations can 
signal financial strength.  A substantial and unexpected increase in the 
level of cash donations can signal that a firm’s insiders perceive the 
company’s future to be good enough to spend ultra-discretionary funds on 
unrelated third parties.  The first contribution of this Article is in shifting 
focus from the traditional “buying goodwill” explanation for corporate 
philanthropy (i.e., companies engage in pro-social sacrifices because 
stakeholders are willing to pay more for corporate goodness) to a signaling 
explanation (i.e., pro-social sacrifices mitigate asymmetric information 
about a firm’s fundamentals).  But corporate philanthropy is not 
unequivocally good for the company.  This is where the Article’s second 
contribution comes in:  examining the conditions under which corporate 
philanthropy decreases firm value.  Under certain circumstances, managers 
can use their discretion over pro-social expenditures to co-opt corporate 
governance mechanisms, thereby increasing the level of agency costs.  This 
occurs, for example, when managers cause companies to donate to 
charitable causes affiliated with independent directors.  The Article next 
evaluates the legal implications of corporate philanthropy.  In particular, 
the theoretical arguments presented here on how philanthropy can be good 
(signaling) or bad (co-optation) for the company strengthen the case for 
introducing some form of mandatory disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate pro-sociality is an important and growing phenomenon.  
Corporate behaviors that do not directly benefit the company or meet legal 
requirements—such as moving to greener production, being employee- 
friendly, or donating to charitable causes—affect not only social and 
environmental causes, but also financial allocations.  Indeed, over three 
trillion dollars are currently invested in part on the basis of corporate social 
performance.1
Yet despite its growing importance, corporate pro-sociality remains an 
elusive phenomenon.  This is especially true in the corporate and securities 
law literature where, instead of understanding the causes and consequences 
of pro-social profit sacrificing, commentators traditionally focus their 
attention on the endless normative debate over whether corporations should 
 
 
 1. See Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States, SOC. INV. 
FORUM 8 (2010), http://ussif.org/resources/research/documents/2010TrendsES.pdf. 
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engage in non-maximizing activities.2  Even when the focus is shifted to 
understanding why companies behave pro-socially, the discussion 
anachronistically alludes to the market forces driving corporate pro-
sociality, without attempting to understand what affects those market 
forces.  In particular, one needs to consider how the current legal regime 
impacts market incentives to engage in pro-sociality.  This Article aims to 
bridge these gaps by advancing our understanding of why companies 
engage in pro-sociality and how the law should regulate it. 
Before we begin our analysis, it is useful to resist the traditional tendency 
to treat various behaviors grouped under the umbrella term Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) as if they present the same descriptive and 
normative issues.  In reality, different pro-social expenditures serve 
different purposes and target different audiences.  This Article focuses on 
the subset of CSR that is called corporate philanthropy (CP), which 
involves explicit pro-social spending.  CP is defined as corporate donations 
to qualified (i.e., tax-exempt) charitable organizations.  My focus, then, will 
be behaviors that are more explicitly non-maximizing.  More precisely, I 
will not focus on behaviors like treating employees nicely, where the 
expenditures are on the immediate corporate realm (operational profit 
sacrificing), or on behaviors like cause-related marketing or corporate 
sponsorships of sports events, which are more akin to traditional 
advertising.  By contrast, CP lacks expectations for an immediate, direct 
quid pro quo.  Such a narrow definition has several advantages.  First, it 
will allow us to resist “fighting the hypothetical,” that is, evading issues 
arising from profit sacrificing by assuming that the behavior is really profit 
maximizing in disguise.  Second, focusing on this extreme example of pro-
sociality also allows us to extrapolate to other, less extreme behaviors along 
the non-maximizing spectrum.  Finally, in the debate over the proper 
purpose of the corporation, CP is the example traditionally used in the legal 
literature.  It is therefore fitting to revisit it by freshly examining the 
assumptions that commentators made in that normative debate.3 
Current accounts of CP fall under two main categories:  the profit-
enhancing approach, which construes CP as buying goodwill for the 
company, and the agency costs approach, which views CP as a managerial 
perk.  Both accounts suffer from under-articulation.  They do not clearly 
identify the mechanisms linking CP with enhanced profits or managerial 
agency costs.  This inadequacy of current explanations may be responsible 
for CP laws’ evolution into a regulatory vacuum.  Since the mid-twentieth 
century, decision makers have been afforded wide discretion to sacrifice 
profits in the public interest, while no protective mechanism—notably, no 
 
 2. See generally A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 3. On the need to study individual components of CSR separately and the advantages 
of focusing on the CP component, see, for example, Baruch Lev et al., Is Doing Good Good 
for You?  How Corporate Charitable Contributions Enhance Revenue Growth, 31 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 182 (2010).  For the terminology I adopt here, see Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). 
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disclosure requirement—applies.  This legal treatment may be a 
consequence of viewing the buying goodwill mechanism as extremely 
simple:  companies donate because stakeholders like the fact that companies 
donate.  Companies can increase profits by acting philanthropically, and if 
CP increases profits, then there is no need to intervene.  Nonexistent legal 
regulation may also be a consequence of a simplified view of the critical 
accounts of CP as agency costs.  The agency approach assumes that 
managers will always have some discretionary resources to spend as they 
wish, as totally eliminating agency costs is simply too costly (monitoring 
managers is imperfect).  Given this level of discretionary resources at the 
managers’ disposal, it should be of no consequence to shareholder value 
whether managers choose to spend on their preferred charity or on traveling 
in luxurious company jets.  Moreover, the understanding goes, these 
expenditures are insignificant in dollar terms and thus do not merit 
intervention. 
The main contribution of this Article is to change the perspective of 
current value-enhancing accounts of CP.  We cannot simply assume that 
companies, by acting nicely, can increase consumers’ or employees’ 
willingness to pay.  The necessary conditions underlying this theory are 
simply too unrealistic.  For one, consumers have to be aware of companies’ 
CP policies and be willing to pay to delegate their philanthropy (that is, pay 
for someone else’s charitable preferences).  We should focus less on 
charitable preferences and warm-glow concepts (cognitive and emotional 
aspects), and more on image considerations:  what information do 
observing outsiders get when companies significantly increase their pro-
social expenditures? 
Explicit sacrifices of profits can serve as costly signals.  They reliably 
convey messages about attributes that are important to shareholders, 
consumers, and employees, who are evaluating whether to invest in, buy 
products from, or work for those companies.  To illustrate, I elaborate on 
the option of CP as a type of a costly signal to investors.  An increase in the 
level of donations could convey messages about financial strength to 
potential investors, who could infer that future free cash flows are perceived 
by insiders to be relatively high, that the company is now less financially 
constrained, or that the riskiness of future cash flows has decreased. 
My CP-as-signaling-to-investors account is the first elaborate treatment 
of such a signaling story.  Other signaling stories are also plausible.  For 
example, pro-sociality could bridge asymmetric information between 
insiders and non-financial stakeholders, such as employees and consumers.  
In those contexts, CP could reliably convey messages about the styles and 
characteristics of top management, such as their personal preferences, the 
extent to which they are subject to “short-termism,” and their commitment 
to a certain corporate culture.  Acknowledging the possibility that benefits 
arise from signaling also has legal implications:  laws affect the flow and 
quality of information, as well as the choice of signals. 
This Article next offers a more modest contribution to the agency costs 
literature on CP.  Even if we assume that CP decisions are driven by 
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managerial utility, it is unclear whether they are detrimental to shareholder 
value or merely a value-neutral diversion (i.e., a substitute for other 
managerial perks within a fixed level of appropriation).  The interesting 
question, then, is not whether managerial utility drives some CP decisions; 
it probably does.  Rather, the question is whether giving managers wide 
discretion over pro-social expenditures affects the level of overall 
appropriation.  I endeavor to show that insiders have both the will and the 
means to strategically select the levels and targets of corporate charity in 
order to covertly bypass mechanisms that are supposed to cap managerial 
agency costs.  Donations to directors’ pet charities can co-opt board 
independence.  Donations to certain educational charities can influence 
politicians and policies, resulting in a sub-optimal level of shareholder 
protection.  Spending on certain environmental or social agendas can help 
managers create coalitions with activist groups, thereby entrenching 
themselves and sub-optimally reducing CEO turnover.  The upshot is that 
some sort of legal intervention may be needed.  Leaving agency problems 
totally unregulated in the CP context could create negative spillovers in 
other contexts. 
With these theoretical contributions in mind, I move to policy 
implications:  rethinking the laws of corporate pro-social profit sacrificing.4  
My primary contribution here is in strengthening the case for disclosure.  
Stressing the importance of informational benefits to those donations driven 
by value enhancement focuses our attention on how the current regulatory 
vacuum leads to an uninformative environment full of cheap talk.  
Regulating some standardized, comparable, subject-to-liability form of 
disclosure could be good for the market by increasing awareness and 
mitigating asymmetric information.  This form of disclosure could also be 
good for the non-profit sector by allowing companies to focus on real 
impact, rather than marketing. 
At the same time, exploiting the potential to use undisclosed CP to co-opt 
governance mechanisms stresses the importance of not leaving CP in the 
dark.  In this respect, legal intervention should focus not only on the levels 
of pro-sociality, but also on its targets.  I then tie the discussion to the 
related, timely topic of corporate political donations laws, which are 
currently in flux.5  I argue that, unlike in the political donations context, 
there is no need to introduce more intrusive protective mechanisms, such as 
a shareholder vote, for “regular” donations. 
Why is it so important to understand CP behavior?  After all, CP is 
“merely” one percent of corporate pretax profits, and five percent of overall 
 
 4. I do not offer a fully detailed blueprint for reform.  Rather, I sketch the initial 
implications of my analysis. 
 5. A 2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision relaxed existing restrictions on political 
spending. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:  Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 
97 n.38 (2010) (referring to proposed legislation before Congress). 
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giving in the U.S.6  My answer is that CP is a practically important, timely, 
and theoretically interesting issue.  Donations from corporations amount to 
around sixteen billion dollars per year.7  That is hardly pocket change for 
investors, not to mention the impact it has on social institutions (by 
supporting, for example, the arts and the healthcare sector).  More 
important, understanding what drives this unusual corporate behavior can 
serve as a starting point for understanding much larger phenomena, lumped 
under the term CSR, which impact trillions of dollars.8
Some notes on scope and terminology are in order.  First, I will deal 
mostly with “direct” corporate giving, as opposed to giving through 
corporate foundations.
  CP is also a timely 
topic, if only because the regulatory overhaul of corporate political 
donations needs to take into account the subtle ways in which CP can be 
used to influence policies.  If you regulate explicit channels only, leaving 
implicit ones untouched, then the goals of regulation may be frustrated.  
Finally, a better understanding of CP can be of theoretical interest.  The 
exception could tell us something about the rule.  If the rule is that 
corporations are single-minded profit maximizers, then delineating the 
exceptions to this rule—such as how and when its limits are crossed—can 
tell us a lot about corporations and their functions in society. 
9
Part I of this Article is a survey of the CP literature.  Part II introduces 
my signaling theory of CP.  Part III clarifies whether and how CP could be 
a corporate governance problem.  Part IV deals with policy implications, 
surveying current laws and evaluating proposals to introduce mechanisms 
that will protect shareholders’ interests from managerial abuse of CP. 
  Second, unless otherwise stated, my analysis will 
deal with large public companies.  Finally, I use terms such as 
“philanthropy” without purporting to make statements about the noble inner 
motives of the giver.  Rather, I will focus on inputs and outputs; that is, the 
fact that the company gives its money in a way that promotes others’ 
wealth. 
 
 6. See GIVING USA FOUND. & CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA 
2011:  THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2010, at 104, 106 (2011) 
[hereinafter GIVING USA 2011]. 
 7. See id. at 4. 
 8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 9. Giving through foundations raises substantially different questions than direct 
giving.  Direct giving is a bigger phenomenon (foundation giving comprises 25 to 30 percent 
of overall CP), so it makes sense to focus on it. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.  A 
corporate foundation is an entity established by the company that qualifies under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) as a charitable organization for tax-exemption purposes.  Companies can transfer 
CP money to their foundations, and the latter decide on when, how much, and to whom to 
donate. See generally Natalie J. Webb, Corporate Profits and Social Responsibility:  
“Subsidization” of Corporate Income Under Charitable Giving Tax Laws, 48 J. ECON. & 
BUS. 401 (1996). 
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I.  CURRENT TAKES ON CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY:  DATA AND THEORY 
A.  Existing Data 
This section situates the CP phenomenon by addressing the following 
questions:  How much do companies give?  To whom?  What do they give, 
cash or products?  Is CP good on average for the financial bottom line?  
Under what firm-specific conditions are CP levels high, and under what 
conditions is CP value enhancing?  Specifically, do firms with strong 
governance mechanisms give more or less?   
1.  Putting Corporate Philanthropy in Perspective:  
The “On Aggregate” Data 
American companies spend approximately fifteen to sixteen billion 
dollars annually on philanthropy.10  In relative terms, CP amounts to one 
percent of corporate pre-tax profits.11  While the absolute amounts increase 
over time, donations as a percentage of profits remain somewhat stable, 
around one percent.  At the industry level, pharmaceutical companies give 
the most.  At the firm level, the biggest product donors (Pfizer, Oracle) 
evaluate their contributions in billions,12 while the biggest cash donors 
(Wal-Mart, Bank of America) each donates around 300 million dollars 
annually.13
Corporations also must decide what to give and to whom.  Cash 
donations have traditionally been the dominant form of giving, but in recent 
years, there has been a movement toward in-kind donations (for example, 
products or employees’ time), especially among pharmaceutical and 
technology companies.
  Among the Fortune 100 companies, the median giving is 
around fifty million dollars annually. 
14  The beneficiaries of CP vary, most notably by 
industry.  The healthcare sector gets the biggest share of CP, which relies 
primarily on the big pharmaceutical donors; followed by educational 
organizations, which rely primarily on the big technology donors.15  
Another interesting pattern is that corporations give very little to religious 
organizations—all the more notable when compared with individual giving 
patterns, where the largest share goes to religious causes.16
 
 10. See GIVING USA 2011, supra note 
 
7, at 4.  Throughout this section, I rely on the 
notable private aggregator of CP crude numbers:  Giving USA, researched and written by the 
Center of Philanthropy at Indiana University (which also surveys other sources).  Data in this 
section come from the Giving USA 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 annual reviews. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 117. 
 13. See id. at 118. 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 117. 
 15. Cf. id. at 108. 
 16. See id. at 76. 
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Who decides CP policy?  It seems that despite a recent trend to put CP 
policy in the hands of specialized departments and professionals, CEOs still 
exert a lot of influence over these discretionary expenditures.17
2.  Does Social Performance Lead to Better Financial Performance?  
The “On Average” Data 
 
These facts can help us understand the basic contours of the 
phenomenon, but we need to know more about CP in order to properly 
evaluate it.  Specifically, is CP economically grounded?  That is, does 
giving affect the financial bottom line, and if so, how? 
There is voluminous literature studying the link between corporate social 
performance and corporate financial performance.  A recent meta-analysis 
summarized the overarching patterns:  there is a small but positive 
association between social and financial performance; this association is 
stronger for CP than for other social performance proxies (such as corporate 
policies and transparency); and the link from financial to social 
performance is at least as strong as the reverse (i.e., doing well enables 
doing good; companies that generate more profits can afford to sacrifice 
more profits in the public interest).18  The main lesson from this meta-
analysis is that, while we cannot conclude that companies do well by doing 
good, we can conclude that companies can both do well and do good.  In 
other words, there is no evident financial punishment for pro-sociality.19
3.  When Does Social Performance Lead to Better Financial Performance?  
The Cross-Sectional Data 
 
We need to go beyond studies on the link between giving and having to 
thoroughly evaluate corporate pro-sociality.  Specifically, instead of 
fruitlessly trying to prove that a strategy (in our case, pro-sociality) is 
generically good for the bottom line, one should try to identify the 
conditions under which CP increases or decreases the value of the 
company.20
 
 17. This is notable when considering the relatively small size of such expenditures.  
CEOs of large companies do not exert such influence on equivalent expenditures. See Jayne 
W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives’ Pet Charities and the Agency Problem, 41 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147, 1157–60 (1997); Jaepil Choi & Heli Wang, The Promise of a 
Managerial Values Approach to Corporate Philanthropy, 75 J. BUS. ETHICS 345, 349, 351 
(2007). 
 
 18. See generally Joshua D. Margolis et al., Does It Pay to Be Good?  A Meta-Analysis 
and Redirection of Research on the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial 
Performance 59 tbl.3 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://stakeholder.bu.
edu/docs/walsh,%20jim%20does%20it%20pay%20to%20be%20good.pdf.  
 19. This is true only to a certain point.  Companies cannot heavily sacrifice profits and 
still do well, as pro-sociality’s impact on financial performance will follow some inverse-U 
shaped form. See Amir Barnea & Amir Rubin, Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict 
Between Shareholders, 97 J. BUS. ETHICS 71, 72 (2010); Heli Wang et al., Too Little or Too 
Much?  Untangling the Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy and Firm Financial 
Performance, 19 ORG. SCI. 143, 146–47 (2008). 
 20. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 33 (2005); Ray Fisman et al., 
Corporate Social Responsibility:  Doing Well by Doing Good? 8 (2005) (unpublished 
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For purposes of this Article, studies linking the quality of corporate 
governance mechanisms and CP behavior are the most interesting.  In 
theory, if there is a positive correlation between strong governance and CP, 
then the profit-enhancing approach is supported, and the need for legal 
intervention decreases.  If there is a positive correlation between weak 
governance and CP, then the agency costs approach is supported, and the 
need for intervention increases.  Yet so far, empirical studies linking 
governance to CP remain largely inconclusive and open to interpretation.  
CP levels positively correlate with some proxies for weak monitoring (for 
example, firms with low debt ratios donate more),21 while negatively 
correlating with others (firms with more independent boards donate 
more).22  To make things more complicated, other conditions that are 
unrelated to governance or agency costs were also found to predict CP 
levels.  Some of those predictors—like advertising intensity, research and 
development expenditures, and labor intensity—lend support to the profit-
enhancing approach.23  But other predictors—notably, the fact that firms 
with fewer financial constraints donate more24—introduce causation issues 
that further complicate the analysis. 
A better theoretical understanding and better data could one day lead to 
more conclusive findings.  But there is a possibility that mixed evidence 
portrays the reality:  CP is a bag of mixed motivations.  “Bad” motivations 
may bring positive spillover effects (such that managerial utility-driven 
decisions can still buy some goodwill with consumers), and good 
 
manuscript), available at http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/jfi/pdf/corporate.social.
responsibility.pdf. 
 21. See generally Barbara R. Bartkus et al., Governance and Corporate Philanthropy:  
Restraining Robin Hood?, 41 BUS. & SOC’Y 319 (2002) (large blockholders and institutional 
investors curtail high levels of CP); William O. Brown et al., Corporate Philanthropic 
Practices, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 855, 857–58 (2006). 
 22. See Brown et al., supra note 21, at 857–58 (noting that board independence is 
positively correlated with CP); Jordi Surroca & Josep A. Tribó, Managerial Entrenchment 
and Corporate Social Performance, 35 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 748 (2008) (noting that board 
independence is positively correlated with corporate social performance in general); Maretno 
A. Harjoto & Hoje Jo, Why Do Firms Engage in Corporate Social Responsibility? (2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.eben.gr/site/Papers/Maretno%20Harjoto
%20WHY%20DO%20FIRMS%20ENGAGE%20IN%20CORPORATE%20SOCIAL%20R
ESPONSIBILITY.pdf (same).  Another study found no support for the hypothesis that the 
duality of CEOs (when sitting as chairpersons of boards) is positively correlated with CP, or 
for the hypothesis that CEO ownership levels are negatively correlated with CP. See Bartkus 
et al., supra note 21, at 332. 
 23. See generally Brown et al., supra note 21, at 868–75; Peter Navarro, Why Do 
Corporations Give to Charity?, 61 J. BUS. 65, 90 (1988).  Firm size is another common 
variable that is often discussed.  For example, a recent study identified a cubic relationship:  
the largest and smallest firms donate a larger share of their taxable income. See Louis H. 
Amato & Christie H. Amato, The Effects of Firm Size and Industry on Corporate Giving, 72 
J. BUS. ETHICS 229, 229–30 (2007). 
 24. See generally Harrison G. Hong et al., Financial Constraints on Corporate Goodness 
31 tbl.3 (Jan. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1734164. 
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motivations may bring negative spillover effects.25  This Article attempts to 
resolve these seemingly conflicting patterns. 
4.  Problems and Gaps in Existing Data 
I approach the data cited in this part with much caution and skepticism.  
Data are often second-hand, self-reported, distorted, and incomplete, and 
the corresponding methods are unable to overcome these deficiencies.26 
Sources of data are especially problematic.  American firms are not 
required to make information on their CP policies available to the public, 
and although firms must detail their tax-exempt donations, the IRS only 
releases aggregate data to the public because of privacy considerations.  
Most empirical studies thus rely either on voluntary CSR reports published 
by the firms, annual surveys by directories and magazines, or “social 
rating” agencies.  Voluntary CSR reports are not subject to any comparable 
standard form or to any threat of liability.  Accordingly, insiders have 
incentives to exaggerate positive elements and to hide negative ones.  These 
reports usually encompass dozens of pages of anecdotes replete with 
pictures of smiling faces, making it difficult to generate hard, quantifiable, 
meaningful information.27  Relying on surveys is also problematic, as they 
suffer from social-desirability bias and high non-response rates.  Companies 
can stop reporting or responding to surveys at will, or alter the form and 
scope of their disclosure when they think that complete disclosure could 
hurt them.  This undoubtedly limits the applicability of empirical findings.28 
Finally, aggregations of data by information intermediaries (for example, 
social rating agencies) also suffer from basic flaws.  First, the market for 
corporate social performance information is characterized by a cacophony 
of indices, each measuring a different aspect, but also measuring similar 
aspects differently.29  Second, these intermediaries rely mostly on voluntary 
information reported by the firms, without superior access to relevant 
information.  Third, the reliability and comparability of this information is 
hampered by under-theorizing problems, such as conflating distinct social 
performance dimensions.30  Indeed, recent systematic empirical studies of 
 
 25. See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market 
for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 580 (2009). 
 26. See Donna J. Wood, Measuring Corporate Social Performance:  A Review, 12 INT’L 
J. MGMT. REVS. 50, 62 (2010). 
 27. See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 20, at 67–68 (noting that reports are overwhelming and 
distorted); id. at 39 (the threat of legal liability for misinformation is non-existent); Li-Wen 
Lin, Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure in Emerging Securities Markets, 35 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 14 & n.55 (2009). 
 28. See, e.g., James R. Boatsman & Sanjay Gupta, Taxes and Corporate Charity:  
Empirical Evidence from Micro-level Panel Data, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 193, 202 (1996). 
 29. See Aaron Chatterji & David Levine, Breaking Down the Wall of Codes:  Evaluating 
Non-financial Performance Measurement, 48 CAL. MGMT. REV. 29, 30 (2006); Michael E. 
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society:  The Link Between Competitive Advantage 
and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 81 (“[T]he existing 
cacophony of self-appointed scorekeepers does little more than add to the confusion.”). 
 30. See Jean-Pascal Gond & Andrew Crane, Corporate Social Performance Disoriented:  
Saving the Lost Paradigm?, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 677, 684–85 (2010); see also supra note 3 and 
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social ratings question the ability of such sources to provide real 
transparency.31 
Aside from data limitations, the empirical literature also suffers in 
methodology and theory.32  Because CSR has always been difficult to 
specify and operationally define, studies vary widely in their use of 
measures, and many stay at a high level of aggregation.  Lumping together 
different dimensions makes it difficult to generate applicable insights, as 
CSR activities are in all likelihood audience specific, and cater to different 
demands.  This is especially true for CP, which is an extremely distinct 
dimension.33  There is also a related lack of articulation of causal 
mechanisms; studies are plagued by endogeneity problems and fail to 
control for important variables and spuriousness.34 
In summary, our knowledge of CP practices consists of a high level of 
generality.  We know that CP is neither a huge nor an insignificant 
corporate expenditure, that top managers exert a lot of influence over these 
ultra-discretionary expenditures, that there is no evidence that pro-sociality 
is being punished financially, and that conditions leading to more giving or 
more profit-minded giving are hard to identify.  Mainly, we know that we 
do not know much.  Clearly, we need a better understanding of the 
mechanisms that might link CP to outcomes that are good or bad for the 
company, as well as better access to reliable and comparable information. 
 
accompanying text.  To illustrate:  the most widely used database is that of KLD’s Socrates, 
which categorizes corporate social performance into seven subgroups.  CP studies use the 
subgroup of “community,” which lumps together and gives equal weight to several different 
aspects:  not only levels of CP, but also highly subjective and less relevant measurements 
such as whether the giving is “innovative” and whether the company supports housing 
projects.  Thus, if company X donates 5 percent of its profits to charity, it might still end up 
with a lower/equal score compared to company Y, which donates 0.5 percent of profits but 
targets housing solutions.  Aside from lumping, the measures themselves are inevitably 
crude; to score “1” and not “0,” companies need to give above 1.5 percent of pretax income 
for the preceding three years.  Thus, company X that donates around 1 percent regularly 
(which amounts to tens of millions of dollars annually) would get the same score as 
company Y which does not engage in CP at all. 
 31. See generally Aaron K. Chatterji et al., How Well Do Social Ratings Actually 
Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 125 (2009). 
 32. See Margolis et al., supra note 18, at 27–28; Brandon Vaidyanathan, Corporate 
Giving:  A Literature Review, SCI. GENEROSITY 31–34 (2008), http://generosityresearch.
nd.edu/assets/17636/corporate_giving_final.pdf. 
 33. On the misguided tendency to lump together all CSR expenditures, see Gerwin Van 
der Laan et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance:  An Extended Stakeholder 
Theory, and Empirical Test with Accounting Measures, 79 J. BUS. ETHICS 299, 299 (2007); 
see also Jennifer C. Chen et al., Corporate Charitable Contributions:  A Corporate Social 
Performance or Legitimacy Strategy?, 82 J. BUS. ETHICS 131 (2008) (showing weak 
correlations between CP and other CSR expenditures); Fisman et al., supra note 20 (same). 
 34. See, e.g., Choi & Wang, supra note 17 (managerial values can drive both variables); 
Margolis et al., supra note 18, at 27. 
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B.  Existing Theory 
Milton Friedman’s credo continues to be the benchmark for accounts of 
CP:  “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”35
From this starting point, theoretical accounts of CP can be divided into 
three categories.  First, CP is profit-enhancing (however indirectly or 
intertemporally), rather than profit-sacrificing.  This approach attacks 
assumptions, implicit in Friedman’s analysis, that social and economic 
performances are unrelated and that corporations cannot satisfy charitable 
preferences better than individuals.
  
Managers engaging in profit sacrificing are seen in this view as taking 
money away from shareholders and imposing a tax on them.  If managers 
cannot put this money to good business use, the argument goes, they should 
pay out to shareholders who could then decide how to satisfy their own 
individual charitable preferences. 
36  Second, CP is managerial utility-
driven.  This approach develops Friedman’s conjectures that CP cannot 
really be characterized as an irrational sacrifice, because expenditures on 
charity are rather extra-rational.  They are chosen not so much for the 
benefits they bring to the company, as for the benefits they bring to the 
agent, the manager.  Third, CP is a moral duty.  This approach talks past 
Friedman’s critique; yes, CP may be profit-sacrificing, but that is fine.  
Companies should do more than just maximize their profits; they should 
also do good for society.37  Critiques of those different theories are 
countless.  For brevity’s sake, I focus on the most prevalent profit-
enhancing and agency costs versions.38
1.  Corporate Philanthropy as Profit Enhancing 
 
This “win-win” or “dual agenda” approach to corporate pro-sociality 
suggests that sacrificing profits in the public interest is actually efficiency 
enhancing:  doing well by doing good.  Various nonexclusive mechanisms 
are typically offered to link pro-sociality and the financial bottom line.  
Two notable categories are, first, delegated philanthropy, which sacrifices 
profits to meet the charitable preferences of stakeholders, thus increasing 
demand or reducing operating costs; and second, long-term benefits, which 
refers to sacrificing profits in the short term to increase value over the long 
 
 35. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133–34 (2d ed. 1982). 
 36. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate 
Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 58–59. 
 37. See generally Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation:  Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 81–85 
(1995); Bill Shaw & Fredrick R. Post, A Moral Basis for Corporate Philanthropy, 12 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 745, 747–50 (1993). 
 38. We will not deal with the “moral duty” approach, as it is normative more than 
descriptive.  To the extent that it aims to describe the phenomenon, it collapses into agency 
explanations.  It is the decision maker, after all, who decides what the morally right thing to 
do is.  In making this choice, I follow the excellent overview of Roland Bénabou & Jean 
Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 ECONOMICA 1 (2010). 
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term.39  The latter approach treats profit sacrificing as a way to run the 
company; it is a distinctive resource with actual effects (for example, 
treating employees nicely).  The delegated philanthropy approach, by 
contrast, focuses on appearance regardless of the actual effects of doing 
good.40
To understand the delegated philanthropy approach, the key is to assume 
that stakeholders have some charitable preferences.  Stakeholders prefer 
“nice” companies—that is, companies that sacrifice profits in the public 
interest.  For example, consumers are assumed to perceive pro-social 
corporate behavior as adding a favorable attribute to the products of the 
donating company.
 
41  Corporations that spend on pro-sociality simply cater 
to consumer demand.  These corporations offer a bundle of direct utility 
from consuming, and “warm glow” from buying, products that were 
manufactured by nice companies.42
Those key assumptions may be too unrealistic to predict actual behavior 
accurately, however.  First, while some survey and experimental evidence 
shows increased willingness to pay for nicer companies’ products, evidence 
of actual buying decisions is rather tenuous.
 
43  Second, even if you believe 
that declarations in surveys do translate into actions, you cannot conclude 
that CP is especially effective at buying goodwill.  Consumers profess 
much stronger preferences for other pro-social expenditures, such as labor 
and environmental issues, than for cash donations.44  Third, it cannot be 
assumed that consumers are aware of different levels of CP.  This 
assumption could hold for certain cause-related marketing programs, such 
as when a product’s package advertises the percentage of revenues that will 
go to charity from each sale, but not for “classical” donations.45
 
 39. See id. at 9–11. 
  Finally, 
 40. See Margolis et al., supra note 18, at 7–8. 
 41. Similar stories are told about other stakeholders, including financial ones (firms offer 
a bundle of warm glow and financial returns on investment). See, e.g., Joshua Graff Zivin & 
Arthur Small, A Modigliani-Miller Theory of Altruistic Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 
TOPICS ECON. ANAL. & POL’Y, no. 1, 2005, at 1. 
 42. See Ray Fisman et al., A Model of Corporate Philanthropy 2 (2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/1331.pdf (providing a 
concise description followed by a critique).  The concept of warm glow denotes the boost to 
direct private utility people experience from acts of giving (regardless of the actual effects on 
recipients or the total supply of charity). See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and 
Donations to Public Goods:  A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 466–68 
(1990). 
 43. See VOGEL, supra note 20, at 46–47; Porter & Kramer, supra note 29, at 83. But see 
Daniel W. Elfenbein & Brian McManus, A Greater Price for a Greater Good?  Evidence 
that Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products, 2 AM. ECON. J.:  ECON. POL’Y 28 
(2010) (study indicating that an eBay charity auction will yield higher prices than an 
equivalent non-charity auction). 
 44. See, e.g., Amato & Amato, supra note 23, at 229; Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 38, 
at 14; Linda Sugin, Encouraging Corporate Charity, 26 VA. TAX REV. 125, 127 n.5, 141 
n.43 (2006). 
 45. See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 20, at 52; Sankar Sen et al., The Role of Corporate 
Social Responsibility in Strengthening Multiple Stakeholder Relationships:  A Field 
Experiment, 34 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 158, 163–64 (2006) (noting that consumer 
awareness of CP is low). 
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even if consumers have meaningful charitable preferences, and even if they 
are willing and able (i.e., aware of CP levels) to act upon them, one still 
needs to explain why consumers would want to delegate charity.  Instead of 
paying more for a nice company’s product, consumers can pay for a value-
adjusted cheaper product of a non-sacrificing firm.  Consumers can then use 
the cash saved to satisfy their own charitable preferences, which, in all 
likelihood, differ somewhat from those of the donating company’s 
managers.  A possible rebuttal is that, in some circumstances, companies 
are better positioned to bundle direct utility with warm glow.  This rebuttal 
could perhaps hold for operational profit sacrificing, where the production 
process or distribution channels generate complementarities with the good 
deeds that are important for stakeholders, but it is less likely to hold for 
explicit profit sacrificing, because CP is easily decoupled from 
production.46
The second strand in win-win approaches to CP—the long-term benefits 
version—assumes that limits of governance and managers’ time horizons 
cause firms to suffer from short-termism.  Those intertemporal problems 
affect not only third parties (externalities), but also firms’ value (if, for 
example, employees are unwilling to make firm-specific investments in 
those firms that are plagued by short-termism).  Adopting an approach that 
allows for profit sacrificing in the public interest could balance this 
detrimental short-termism.  It could push insiders toward developing skills 
and a willingness to satisfy the implicit demands of stakeholders whose 
cooperation is needed (labor, regulators, community), thus maximizing 
intertemporal profits.
 
47
The general flaws of the long-term benefits version are reviewed 
elsewhere.
 
48  For purposes of this Article, the limited applicability of the 
long-term benefits version to CP is especially relevant.  If its basic premise 
is to promote firm-specific investments by key stakeholders, then it is hard 
to explain sacrificing profits to benefit unrelated third parties who do not 
make firm-specific investments (i.e., charitable organizations).49
 
 46. Compare Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 
  Consider 
a notable attempt in the corporate law literature to apply such an approach:  
Margaret Blair’s application of the “team production” model.  Blair 
38, at 10–11, with Fisman et al., supra note 
42, at 2.  Even within the context of operational profit sacrificing, there are reasons to doubt 
the argument:  complementarities of good deeds and production do not always exist, and are 
not always readily observable to outsiders. See id. at 2. 
 47. See Fisman et al., supra note 42, at 2.  A key assumption in such an argument is that 
contracts are incomplete. 
 48. See, e.g., Porter & Kramer, supra note 29, at 82. 
 49. A related version sees profit sacrificing as a defensive strategy, meant to reduce the 
volatility of future cash flows by limiting the uncertain future claims and decreasing the 
likelihood of future regulatory intervention. See Sadok El Ghoul et al., Does Corporate 
Social Responsibility Affect the Cost of Capital?, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 2388, 2390 (2011).  
The argument of inapplicability to CP that appears in the body of the text applies also to 
such a “defensive” version.  CP, unlike other CSR activities, is not about being nice to 
potential claimants; it is about being nice to unrelated parties, non-claimants.  Thus, CP has 
to rest on some image considerations:  parties you care about observe how nice you behaved 
to unrelated parties, and then they update their beliefs and act accordingly. 
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describes CP as a specific example of how directors ought to—and do in 
fact—use their discretion to steer a clear path between different 
stakeholders within the organization.50  What Blair sidesteps is that the 
ultimate beneficiaries of directors’ discretion to engage in CP—tax-exempt 
organizations—cannot be thought of as part of the “team” that engages in 
“production.”51  The example Blair uses to bypass this problem is telling.  
She claims that the infamous case of an oil company, Occidental Petroleum 
Co. (Oxy) paying eighty-five million dollars to build a museum in the name 
of its soon-to-retire CEO is justified because an especially powerful 
member of the team (the CEO) enjoyed this expenditure.52  This example 
illustrates how “stakeholder” explanations to CP collapse into other 
explanations (for example, justifying CP as a substitute for explicit CEO 
compensation)53 and fail to specify independently how to make and 
measure necessary tradeoffs.54
2.  Corporate Philanthropy as Agency Costs 
 
The win-win approach stresses the adaptive features of CP as benefiting 
the company.  The agency costs approach, by contrast, suggests that the 
seemingly irrational profit-sacrificing phenomenon survives because it 
 
 50. See Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 
STETSON L. REV. 27, 49–50 (1998). 
 51. Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office:  Shareholder 
Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1220 (1999). 
 52. See Blair, supra note 50, at 46–47.  For further discussion of the Oxy example, see 
infra notes 112–07 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Symposium, Corporate Social Responsibility:  Paradigm or Paradox?, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1282, 1321 (1998).  Alternatively, Blair could argue that this donation is 
necessary to establish the role of directors as mediating hierarchs, signaling to the other team 
members (not just the benefited CEO) the directors’ ability to function well in such a role 
and eliciting a cooperative response.  But then the team production argument collapses into 
an explanation about image concerns as a sort of signaling:  we need to make clear why and 
how exactly CP generates value through image considerations. See infra Part II. 
 54. Can the CEO be paid back for his contribution with $200 million of CP?  At whose 
expense?  Why not use these $85 million to benefit other team members, such as employees 
in match-giving programs? See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of 
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 447–49 (2001); Michael Jensen, Value 
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPL. CORP. 
FIN. 8 (2001).  As applied to the CP context, see James P. Shannon, Foreword to CORPORATE 
PHILANTHROPY AT THE CROSSROADS (Dwight F. Burlingame & Dennis R. Young eds., 1996).  
Also, if we see donations as benefiting dominant team members (executives), then arguably 
donations should be subjected to similar rules that apply to perks and executive 
compensation (i.e., much more stringent disclosure and tax rules). Cf. Blair, supra note 50, at 
46 n.64.  I will return to this point in Parts III and IV. 
  In my opinion, there are stronger versions of the long-term approach, such as 
suggesting that CP enhances the company’s value by buying moral wiggle room with the 
public and politicians. See Paul C. Godfrey, The Relationship Between Corporate 
Philanthropy and Shareholder Wealth:  A Risk Management Perspective, 30 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 777 (2005) (CP generates moral capital among stakeholders and communities; this 
moral capital is used as insurance to protect firms’ relational assets); see also Ailian Gan, 
The Impact of Public Scrutiny on Corporate Philanthropy, 69 J. BUS. ETHICS 217 (2006) 
(companies subject to public scrutiny are more likely to donate). 
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makes corporate decision makers better off.  The impetus driving CP 
behavior is private benefits to those insiders; they donate with shareholders’ 
money and enjoy disproportionate benefits from the expenditure.  Among 
the benefits CP can confer to managers are social currency in elite circles, 
access to tangible benefits (board seats or tickets to gala events), 
satisfaction of their individual other-regarding preferences, and warm 
glow.55
But the managerial utility explanations do not provide well-developed 
accounts of the mechanisms that make managers choose CP as a channel to 
reap private benefits.  To illustrate, it makes no sense for managers to 
engage in CP in order to enhance their personal reputations, if the 
correlation between levels of engagement in CP and managerial personal 
traits is questionable (i.e., if industry and firm characteristics dictate much 
of the ability to engage in CP).
 
56  Alternatively, if the reason managers 
engage in CP is to signal their power over their company’s resources, there 
are other, arguably more effective means to achieve such a goal, such as 
negotiating for better traditional perks (for example, a private jet or a 
luxurious corner office).  And if the manager engages in CP to get warm 
glow and satisfy her own charitable preferences, she could arguably get 
more warm glow from negotiating higher pay and then donating the extra 
dollars in her own name.  A fuller managerial utility explanation should 
thus point out unique attributes of pro-social profit sacrificing that make it 
effective at generating private benefits.57  Indeed, existing data casts doubt 
on mechanisms that were traditionally offered to link CP to managerial 
utility.  For example, it was found that firms that pay their CEOs more are 
not the firms that donate more.58
Another related flaw of managerial utility accounts is that they do not 
clearly answer the “so what?” question:  assuming CP is indeed driven by 
managerial utility, is it necessarily bad for the company, the shareholders, 
or overall welfare?  In Part III, I will try to narrow these flaws by explaining 
how pro-social expenditures are effective at generating private benefits, and 
under what conditions pro-sociality is bad for shareholders and society. 
 
While both profit-enhancing and agency costs approaches hold some 
sway, each approach suffers from flaws.  Deciding which model captures 
 
 55. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 17, at 1160–64; Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s 
Box:  Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
579, 609–25 (1997). 
 56. For example, financial constraints dictate much of CP levels. See Hong et al., supra 
note 24; cf. John F. Padgett, Corporate Potlatch, 15 CONTEMP. SOC. 818, 820–21 (1986). 
 57. For example, one should come up with a story on how gaining discretion over CP 
money does not come at the expense of more pay, but rather increases the potential pay 
package—perhaps because it stretches the “outrage constraint.” Cf. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & 
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 64–70 (2004).  Pro-sociality, the argument would 
go, is by nature less susceptible to trigger backlash by outsiders than explicit pay/perks. 
 58. See Navarro, supra note 23; Steven C. Trost, An Examination of Corporate 
Charitable Contributions:  Evidence from Firm, Managerial, and Community Factors 90–93 
(May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia), available at 
http://www.stevenctrost.com/diss.pdf (replacement of CEO does not change the firm’s 
giving policy). 
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reality more accurately is an empirical question, but the evidence is 
currently inconclusive.  The dearth of firm-specific data and the lack of 
means to address causality do not help.  The few notable firm-specific 
studies generate contrasting results.59  Even findings presumed to favor one 
approach can be interpreted to cut both ways, at least until the mechanisms 
that link CP to company-level and managerial level benefits are better 
articulated.60  This Article next sets forth an attempt at a better explanation 
of these mechanisms. 
II.  CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AS A COSTLY SIGNALING MECHANISM 
We saw that profit-enhancing explanations are missing something, but 
what exactly is missing?  To illustrate, consider a puzzling pattern 
identified by an oft-cited study, which tested whether and how pro-sociality 
reduces labor costs.61  The hypotheses generated by the traditional buying 
goodwill argument are, first, that companies that are more pro-social will do 
better at attracting potential job applicants.  Second, that the effect will be 
mediated by the applicants’ “social” preferences, that is, applicants who feel 
strongly about social or environmental issues will be more attracted to pro-
social companies.  The study’s findings were consistent with the first 
hypothesis:  in line with the value-enhancing theme, applicants did consider 
pro-social companies as more attractive places to work.  But the study did 
not support the second hypothesis:  inconsistent with the buying goodwill 
mechanism, the effect was not mediated by the applicants’ social or 
environmental preferences.  Potential job applicants considered pro-social 
companies as more attractive to work for, regardless of whether applicants 
cared about social issues.62 
This implies that preferences and delegated philanthropy arguments are 
not giving us the full account of the benefits arising from pro-sociality.  We 
should switch focus to image considerations.  Apparently, the fact that a 
company engages in high levels of pro-sociality was indicative of 
something that convinced applicants that the company has other favorable 
attributes.  Even strictly profit-minded stakeholders prefer companies that 
are nice; not because of the niceness per se, but rather because niceness is 
an indication of something else.  The interesting questions are thus:  what is 
pro-sociality indicative of, and how exactly can pro-sociality be credibly 
indicative of other traits?  The following is my attempt to answer these 
questions and better understand an unnoticed mechanism that ties pro-
 
 59. For notable early studies, see generally Boatsman & Gupta, supra note 28 (the 
association between CP and tax rates suggests giving beyond profit maximization 
considerations); Navarro, supra note 23 (firm characteristics drive CP more than managerial 
characteristics).  For a more recent study, see generally Brown et al., supra note 21 (mixed 
results). 
 60. See Bartkus et al., supra note 21, at 337; Choi & Wang, supra note 17, at 346. 
 61. See Daniel W. Greening & Daniel B. Turban, Corporate Social Performance as a 
Competitive Advantage in Attracting a Quality Workforce, 39 BUS. & SOC’Y 254 (2000). 
 62. Id. 
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sociality to value enhancement—namely, the mitigation of asymmetric 
information between outsiders and insiders. 
A.  The Basic Story:  Signaling Financial Strength 
It is plausible to assume that there is asymmetric information about 
companies’ underlying attributes.  Insiders know more than outsiders.  Both 
have incentives to mitigate the asymmetry.  One method for insiders to 
mitigate asymmetries is to communicate information to target audiences 
about unobservable qualities through observable, costly activities (for 
example, handicapping yourself to signal that you can afford it).  This is the 
basic background of a costly signaling story.  As applied here, profit 
sacrificing in general and CP in particular can serve as costly and 
observable attributes, conveying messages about unobservable attributes.  
Out of many possible versions, I will focus on one specific example:  CP as 
signaling future free cash flows to outside investors. 
The signaler in our informal model is the company, or, more precisely, its 
insiders (i.e., decision makers, such as top management or dominant 
shareholders).  Receivers of the signal—the target audience—are outside 
investors.  Insiders want to convey messages to outsiders about an 
underlying but not readily observable attribute, so that outsiders increase 
their valuation of the company.  One important attribute for valuation is 
future free cash flows.  Because future free cash flows are not readily 
observable by outsiders, they make a plausible subject for costly 
signaling.63
But for such a signal to work, it needs to be more than just costly.  It has 
to be costlier for low-quality companies in order to avoid mimicry (the 
costs have to be differentiating and quality-dependent).  In the current 
context, cash donations need to be costlier for firms with low future free 
cash flows than for those with high cash flows. 
  What could constitute an observable costly attribute that 
credibly conveys messages about future cash flows?  In the current context, 
big changes in cash donations could fit the bill.  Cash donations are costly 
in an intuitive manner:  insiders decide to take a dollar that they could have 
used to meet the demands of contractual claimants, and instead give it to 
unrelated third parties.  Outsiders that observe a company substantially 
increasing its expenditures on pro-social profit sacrificing will infer that the 
company’s insiders perceive their ability to procure future resources as 
better than was previously evaluated.  Outsiders then update their forecasts 
about the company’s prospects accordingly. 
One could argue that companies with low future cash flows can finance a 
high level of donations out of retained earnings or external finance.  If 
insiders can simply borrow money to raise their CP levels even when times 
are bad, then outsiders will not change their valuations based on observing 
CP.  Yet a recent empirical study showing that corporate goodness is 
 
 63. Accounting concepts like depreciation and capital investment bridge a gap between 
net profits and uncommitted cash flows.  Asymmetric information only increases when the 
attribute in question is a perceived future ability. 
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costlier for financially constrained firms refutes this argument.64  There are 
several possible reasons behind such a link between corporate goodness and 
financial constraints.  For one, borrowing to finance the donations is costlier 
for companies with relatively bad future prospects because it requires them 
to expose themselves to unfavorable covenants or disclosure 
requirements.65  Furthermore, there is evidence that managers care deeply 
about meeting earnings benchmarks and smoothing earnings, to the extent 
that they will even sacrifice projects with positive net present value to set 
aside buffer cash.66  Thus, it is plausible to assume that insiders in low 
quality firms will find it more costly to spend ultra-discretionary dollars on 
CP, since they need all the cash buffers they can get.  Outsiders observing a 
large increase in CP levels could therefore infer that insiders know they are 
not going to be financially constrained.67
Put differently, the conditions for costly signaling are in nuce as 
follows.
 
68
If these propositions are plausible, then we can assume that 
communication through profit sacrificing will be informative.  Yet a fully 
conscious, meditated decision to sacrifice profits with a clear intent to 
signal financial strength is not needed.  When the above propositions apply, 
we can assume that some “design force”—conscious decision-making, 
  First, companies vary in their ability to generate future free cash 
flows.  Second, outside investors cannot readily observe future free cash 
flows, and stand to gain from knowing more about them.  Third, at the same 
time, outsiders cannot simply believe all direct messages from insiders 
about future free cash flows; insiders stand to gain from sending false, 
exaggerated signals.  So, outsiders resort to making inferences based on 
some observable, costly behaviors of companies, and the fact that the 
behavior is costly assures the credibility of the signal; low-quality signalers 
cannot incur the same amount of costs as high-quality signalers.  Fourth, 
one such observable behavior is explicit profit sacrificing.  Big cash 
donations will carry information about the prospects of the company as long 
as the costs of donating are negatively correlated with an ability to generate 
future free cash flows. 
 
 64. See Hong et al., supra note 24.  Another recent study that could be interpreted as 
suggestive evidence in favor of signaling establishes that CP is a good predictor (“Granger-
cause”) of future financial health (revenue growth). See generally Lev et al., supra note 3. 
 65. For a discussion of external finance as cost-differentiating, see generally Sudipto 
Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and “The Bird in the Hand” Fallacy, 
10 BELL J. ECON. 259 (1979) (a dividend-signaling model). 
 66. Cf. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 33 tbl.6 (2005). 
 67. Alternatively, outsiders can infer that insiders do not care so much about meeting the 
earnings per share benchmarks and are not subject to short-term market pressures. 
 68. My informal model builds on formal models of signaling developed in economics 
and sociobiology. See, e.g., Herbert Gintis et al., Costly Signaling and Cooperation, 213 J. 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 103 (2001); Alan Grafen, Biological Signals as Handicaps, 144 J. 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 517 (1990); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 
355 (1973). See generally AMOTZ ZAHAVI & AVISHAG ZAHAVI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE:  A 
MISSING PIECE OF DARWIN’S PUZZLE (1997) (elaborating on signaling explanations in 
sociobiology). 
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market forces selection, or imitation of successful companies—will instill 
in CP the tenets of a costly, informative signal of financial strength.  But are 
all these propositions really possible?  The next section elaborates on their 
potential limitations to arrive at a definition of signaling by conspicuous 
goodness. 
B.  Refining the Basic Story:  Limitations 
Before concluding that pro-social profit sacrifices bring benefits through 
signaling, several conditions and limitations need to be addressed.  A 
classical criticism against signaling explanations applies in our context as 
well:  why one particular signal and not another?  If throwing cash away 
serves as a signal for an ability to procure resources, why should companies 
throw it away on charitable organizations?  All it takes is for a firm to 
sacrifice profits, so why make the sacrifice in the public interest?  Why not 
signal, for example, with dividend policy?69  The key to answering this 
question is acknowledging that signaling through pro-social sacrifices does 
not preclude the use of other signals.  In real life, unlike in models, multiple 
messages are conveyed by multiple means (both costly and non-costly).70
First, some potential signaling channels are often blocked or are too 
costly for some firms.  For example, most firms do not pay dividends.
  
The real question, then, is not choosing CP over dividends, but what the 
mix of signals chosen in the given circumstances will be.  While a complete 
answer to the mix-of-signals question is beyond the scope of this Article, I 
sketch a few guidelines below. 
71
Second, even when different signaling channels are all open, insiders will 
not necessarily choose only one channel.  For example, signal choice is 
affected by the probability that signal receivers will make errors when 
evaluating them.  When receivers are error-prone, signalers may try to 
increase the accuracy by using a “backup,” that is, conveying the same 
message through multiple signaling channels rather than exaggerating 
signals through the same channel.
  If 
those firms need to signal an ability to procure resources, they have to 
resort to other channels, perhaps pro-sociality. 
72
 
 69. For a discussion of the classical dividend-signaling models, see generally 
Bhattacharya, supra note 
  Indeed, the corporate environment 
65; Kose John & Joseph Williams, Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes:  
A Signalling Equilibrium, 40 J. FIN. 1053 (1985); Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend 
Policy Under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN. 1031 (1985). 
 70. In finance, see Harry DeAngelo et al., Reversal of Fortune:  Dividend Signaling and 
the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 341, 365 (1996).  In 
sociobiology, see generally Eileen A. Hebets & Daniel R. Papaj, Complex Signal Function:  
Developing a Framework of Testable Hypotheses, 57 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 
197 (2005). 
 71. See Alon Brav et al., Payout Policy in the 21st Century, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 483, 516 
(2005). 
 72. Rufus A. Johnstone, Multiple Displays in Animal Communication:  ‘Backup Signals’ 
and ‘Multiple Messages,’ 351 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS BIOLOGICAL SCI. 329 (1996) [hereinafter 
Johnstone, Multiple Displays].  The reason we borrow insights from models developed in the 
sociobiology literature is that the information economics literature focuses more on the 
strategic aspects of signaling (the why), while sociobiology focuses more on the efficacy of 
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creates a greater need for backup signaling in the face of obstacles such as 
noisy communications, strong incentives to cheat, widely varying 
perceptions and preferences of receivers, and accelerating signaling costs.73  
Accordingly, when insiders want to signal good prospects, they may 
supplement the increase in dividends with an increase in CP levels, thus 
increasing the chances that outsiders get the right message (for example, 
that outsiders are not attributing an increase in dividends to managers 
bowing to pressures from shareholders eager for payouts).  While this CP-
as-backup-signal speculation is ultimately a matter for future empirical 
research, existing evidence indicates that it is not farfetched.  Firms that pay 
out more also donate more.74
Third, aside from factoring in the possibility that multiple signals convey 
the same message, we also need to acknowledge that, in reality, each signal 
conveys multiple distinct messages.  It is true that if insiders want to signal 
financial strength, they can do so through various types of sacrifices:  
burning money in the street, building luxurious headquarters, or purchasing 
lavish perks.  Conspicuous consumption—not just conspicuous 
generosity—can signal an ability to procure resources.
 
75  But each type of 
sacrifice also conveys messages apart from information about changes in 
resources.  For example, the type of sacrifice could say something about 
management’s commitment to business strategies.  A pro-social handicap 
suggests that managers do not hoard cash for themselves and are not subject 
to pressure by shareholders to pay out each free dollar.76
 
signaling (the how).  Efficacy considerations cannot be ignored when analyzing corporate 
communications in a noisy environment filled with strong incentives to cheat. Telephone 
Interview with Rufus Johnstone, Dep’t of Zoology, Univ. of Cambridge (Mar. 15, 2011). 
  By contrast, 
managerial perks do not convey messages about the pro-social tendencies of 
corporate decision makers.  And dividends do not convey messages about 
 73. For discussions on conditions for backup signaling, see generally Hebets & Papaj, 
supra note 70 (existence of several different groups of receivers and variability of 
preferences within groups of receivers induces backups); Johnstone, Multiple Displays, 
supra note 72 (accelerating costs of the main signal); Sarah R. Partan & Peter Marler, Issues 
in the Classification of Multimodal Communication Signals, 166 AM. NATURALIST 231 
(2005) (non-cooperative, competitive contexts favor the evolution of conspicuous, redundant 
signals). 
 74. See Navarro, supra note 23, at 87–88.  Although the positive correlation does not 
prove that CP is used as a backup signal to dividends (there are other ways to explain the 
positive correlation), it nevertheless indicates a direction worth pursuing and a pattern for 
which we must account. 
 75. Cf. Vladas Griskevicius et al., Blatant Benevolence and Conspicuous Consumption:  
When Romantic Motives Elicit Strategic Costly Signals, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
85, 86–87 (2007) (conspicuous generosity—for example, public acts of philanthropy—can 
signal both an ability to procure resources and a pro-social personality/tendency.  By 
contrast, acts of conspicuous consumption can be an alternative signal to the former, but not 
to the latter). See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 
(Penguin ed. 1994) (1899) (recognized as the first elaborate treatment of conspicuous 
consumption as signaling). 
 76. In that respect, a better understanding of pro-social behavior could serve as a 
window to an area in need of future research:  managerial styles and their economic 
consequences. See generally Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, Managing with Style:  
The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1169, 1170–72 (2003). 
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how managers are insulated from the pressure of shareholders with short-
term interests.  This does not suggest that pro-social profit sacrificing is a 
better signal.  After all, too much pro-sociality or too much insulation from 
shareholder demands could be interpreted negatively by investors.  In 
general, because the effectiveness of signals depends on their ability to be 
interpreted favorably by receivers,77
Another major criticism of the costly signaling theory is that CP is not 
really costly.  To be sure, CP does cost something, but is it truly a handicap 
to big firms?  After all, CP levels in many companies represent only a 
“modest incremental cash drain on resources available to managers,”
 the mix of signals is expected to vary 
across companies and times.  For example, the mix will depend on how 
outsiders evaluate the company’s investment opportunities.  The point is 
that the existence of other potential ways to signal does not categorically 
eliminate the potential for signaling benefits from conspicuous goodness. 
78 and 
modest costs cannot differentiate between high- and low-quality signalers.  
The key to accommodating this limitation is to refine our predictions 
regarding benefits arising from signaling.  Pro-sociality will convey 
credible messages about future financial prospects only when conducted on 
a large scale relative to a company’s size and resources.  Day-to-day 
marginal contributions are not likely to generate signaling benefits; big 
changes in CP policy are.79  For example, in March 2008, when Goldman 
Sachs announced a new $100 million CP program meant to further business 
education of women in the developing world, outsiders took notice.80  
Outsiders were free to infer that Goldman’s top managers simply cared 
about the cause of women’s business education, or that they were hoping to 
buy goodwill by appearing nice.  But outsiders may also have inferred that 
Goldman’s managers thought that the company could afford to sacrifice 
profits much more than it had previously because future prospects were 
looking brighter.  An event study checking the impact of announcements of 
big donations (or, conversely, announcements of omissions from social 
rankings or surveys) is another matter for future empirical research.81
 
 77. An effective signal is less prone to a “mixed-motivations” problem:  outsiders 
perceive the expenditure not as an arbitrary cost (that is, a handicap signaling something), 
but rather as a cost incurred in order to generate intrinsic benefits to the signaler.  When 
behavior is perceived to be intrinsically beneficial to the actor, it cannot be an effective 
costly signal. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 11–35 (2000). 
 
 78. See DeAngelo et al., supra note 70, at 343–44; id. at 368 (noting that corporate 
signals must be considerable handicaps). 
 79. The emphasis is not only on “big” but also on “changes.”  CP policy of pursuing 
rigidly a rule of thumb like donating 1 percent of profits year after year will tell us less than 
unexpected changes. 
 80. See 10,000 Women Brochure, GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/
citizenship/10000women/10000-women-immersive/10000-women-brochure.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2012). 
 81. Of course, a positive stock price impact could be interpreted in many ways.  The key 
in such a future study would thus be to identify the contrasting predictions.  To simplify:  a 
signaling-benefits hypothesis would predict a bigger impact in companies and industries that 
are more equity-dependent and where future prospects are more uncertain, while under the 
buying goodwill hypothesis, the benefits of being nice are unrelated to financial strength or 
to asymmetric information. 
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What is more, the perceived costs of explicit profit sacrifices are arguably 
greater relative to their absolute costs and to expenditures such as 
operational profit sacrifices.  Managers of companies that fail to meet 
expectations will arguably be pressed to explain why they were so 
conspicuously generous with the company’s dwindling resources, rather 
than to explain equivalent expenditures on greener modes of production or 
employees’ conditions.  In other words, ultra-discretionary expenditures on 
unrelated third parties, especially when the resources could have been easily 
deployed within the company, are likely to be perceived as meaningful 
handicaps even when their absolute size is small relative to other 
expenditures. 
A related potential criticism would suggest that CP is not a reliable signal 
precisely because it is too discretionary.  If insiders suffer no punishment 
when reducing the level of CP, then the value of the signal is eroded.  To 
accommodate this limitation, we first need to understand that the stickiness 
of signals is not a binary matter.  Indeed, signals need to have some level of 
stickiness82 to be reliable because something removable at will is not a true 
handicap.  But once this minimal threshold of stickiness is reached, the 
optimal level of stickiness varies according to many considerations.  Do 
pro-social expenditures meet this stickiness threshold?  While CP might be 
less sticky than other pro-social expenditures (such as reversing 
expenditures on employees’ working conditions), anecdotal evidence 
indicates that there is a degree of asymmetric stickiness to CP.  Managers 
enjoy much flexibility when deciding to initiate or raise CP levels, but there 
are perceived costs to omitting or dropping existing levels.  For example, 
managers fear reputational sanctions and personal pressures from NGOs if 
the company drops its support.  Social ratings by information intermediaries 
provide another commitment mechanism, because the stock market 
apparently punishes companies when their social ratings decrease.83
A fourth potential limitation of the signaling theory is that pro-sociality is 
not observable to outsiders in a timely and useful manner.  Although this 
limitation applies more strongly to operational profit sacrificing than to 
CP—cash donations in particular are readily communicated and 
quantified—this is still a strong limitation.  As mentioned, disclosure of CP 
is unregulated, and this creates an environment in which it is difficult for 
companies to reliably convey the relative level of their explicit pro-
sociality.
 
84
 
 82. “Stickiness” here denotes the tendency of decision makers to leave the level of an 
expenditure unchanged.  The various considerations dictating the optimal level of stickiness 
from a signaling-efficacy point of view include, among other things, what message is 
conveyed (is it a transitory fixed change in underlying attributes?), and what other means are 
available to convey this message (increasing the dividend level?). 
  Though lack of regulation is likely to reduce the benefits from 
signaling, it will not totally eliminate them.  We should think of it as 
 83. See Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 38, at 12 n.18; Interview with Bill Valentino, Vice 
President for CSR in China, Bayer, in Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 6, 2010).    To be sure, such 
an argument about the level of stickiness is speculative, and future event studies are still 
needed to establish it. 
 84. See infra Part IV. 
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creating conditions for some coarse signaling story:  companies wishing to 
distinguish themselves can voluntarily disclose their conspicuous goodness 
in a wide and timely manner, but outsiders will be able to distinguish 
between companies based on their CP levels only when the differences 
across companies and time are great.  Again, the conclusion is that the 
profit sacrifices most likely to generate signaling benefits are big changes, 
which are easily communicated to outsiders. 
Having accommodated all those considerations,85 we are now left with a 
limited, refined story of corporate pro-sociality as a signal to outside 
investors.  Only sacrifices that are relatively significant in size, readily 
observable, and not easily reversed can be expected to serve as an effective 
signal.86  Granted, these limitations confine the applicability of the 
signaling story to only a small number of actual CP decisions.  Yet it is 
precisely those few large donations that are practically important; a small 
number of donations comprise the bulk of overall corporate giving 
expenditures and raise the most concerns.87
Furthermore, even when circumstances make the signaling-to-investors 
story unlikely, it is important to consider the asymmetric information 
perspective on pro-social expenditures.  It could be that pro-sociality 
conveys other messages to other audiences.  For example, product or 
employee release-time donations
  The signaling-to-investors 
story is therefore relevant to the more significant and/or controversial cases 
of CP, and thus merits attention. 
88
 
 85. There is another, generic objection that was not addressed here.  Corporate signaling 
models rely on twin assumptions:  not only asymmetric information, but also short-termism.  
That is, managers are assumed to care about current stock prices and not just about finite 
value.  If they cared only about finite value, then they would have no reason to incur the 
costs of signaling to convey information that will be eventually reflected in stock prices 
anyhow.  Against these twin assumptions, the argument goes, why can shareholders not 
contract with managers to reduce incentives to engage in costly signaling? See generally 
Philip H. Dybvig & Jaime F. Zender, Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with 
Asymmetric Information, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 201, 204–15 (1991).  The answers to this generic 
objection are well developed in the finance literature, and I defer to them. See, e.g., Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or 
Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719, 722 n.6 (1993). 
 might be ineffective signals to investors 
looking for information on future financial conditions, but they could serve 
as effective signals to employees looking for information on management’s 
commitment to a certain corporate culture.  It is these other sorts of 
signaling stories—signaling to non-financial stakeholders—to which this 
Article now turns. 
 86. Additionally, alternative non-pro-social signals should be somewhat cost-
accelerating or noisy. 
 87. See REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE OF THE U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON H.R. 887 REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 32 (May 2009), reprinted in Increasing Disclosure to Benefit 
Investors:  Hearing on H.R. 887 and H.R. 1089 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous 
Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 90 (1999) [hereinafter Increasing 
Disclosure to Benefit Investors]. 
 88. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Other Possible Stories:  Signaling Product Quality 
or Workplace Attractiveness 
In order to flesh out the plausibility of benefits arising from signaling in 
corporate pro-sociality, I used a specific example of conveying messages to 
investors about financial strength.89
According to a signaling-to-customers story, high levels of CP convey 
information about the quality of the firm’s product.
  To my knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to describe value-enhancing aspects of CP in this way.  But pro-
sociality in general, and CP in particular, can also have other informational 
contents and target audiences.  This section addresses those different 
signaling stories.  First, I discuss the few previous accounts of signaling that 
are found in the management and finance literature, in which CP is studied 
as conveying messages to customers or employees.  Then, I sketch another 
possibility of signaling to investors, which conveys the riskiness of future 
cash flows. 
90
While this general direction of inquiry is worthy, in my opinion, the 
specifics of this signaling-to-customers theory rests on some shaky 
assumptions.  First, just like delegated philanthropy explanations, the 
signaling-to-customers theory assumes that charitable preferences drive 
corporate behavior—only here, the preferences are those of entrepreneurs 
rather than consumers.  Such an assumption might be plausible in manager-
owned, small companies where the entrepreneur is tantamount to the 
company, but it is less plausible for large impersonal corporations.
  The model assumes 
two types of entrepreneurs.  One type has other-regarding preferences, and 
thus cares about externalities, and the other type lacks those preferences and 
cares only about profits.  For the other-regarding types, sacrificing profits is 
less costly, as they gain warm glow by refraining from externalities.  By 
contrast, for the purely profit-motivated entrepreneurs, CP is a total 
sacrifice.  Accordingly, the model assumes that when customers observe a 
company engaging in higher CP levels than its competitors, they infer that 
insiders in this company will be more averse to sacrifice unobservable 
qualities of products than their competitors are (because sacrificing product 
quality will generate externalities, which will in turn decrease the other-
regarding entrepreneur’s utility).  This theory addresses some of the flaws 
in the delegated philanthropy accounts.  It argues that CP is value-
enhancing not because it satisfies customers’ preferences for nice 
companies, but rather because it mitigates informational gaps about 
attributes relevant to the company’s line of business. 
91
 
 89. See supra Part II.A. 
  
Second, the theory assumes that information on CP levels can be easily 
observed and compared by customers who make purchases accordingly, but 
 90. See Fisman et al., supra note 42 (setting out a model); see also Donald S. Siegel & 
Donald F. Vitaliano, An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 773 (2007) (empirical testing of the model). 
 91. Moreover, firms could simply select managers with charitable preferences, thus 
gaining a competitive advantage. 
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recent empirical studies suggest that consumers’ awareness of CP policies 
is actually low.92
Another possibility for pro-sociality to generate signaling benefits is 
through attracting high-quality employees.  Proponents of the profit-
enhancing approach frequently argue that one of CP’s benefits is decreased 
costs of labor, but they do not adequately articulate the mechanisms that 
supposedly cause this.  A “delegated philanthropy” mechanism—
suggesting that employees’ morale gets a boost from working for nice 
companies—is problematic for the reasons mentioned above, and a “better-
image” mechanism—suggesting that a company’s “niceness” gives it a 
better image as a workplace—is merely a starting point for analysis.  
Instead, the question is:  how exactly is CP associated with working 
conditions? 
 
This relates to the puzzling empirical pattern discussed above:  job 
applicants preferred pro-social companies regardless of how they felt about 
pro-sociality itself.93  So what did the level of pro-sociality teach applicants 
about the company?  For one, pro-sociality could have sent a message about 
a “cooperative” corporate culture.  High pro-sociality suggests that the top 
management is committed to being not only profit-hungry, but also other-
regarding.  Donating managers will thus be seen as more likely to continue 
to engage in “gift-exchange” relationships with employees in the future.  
More generally, explicit profit sacrificing can serve as a credible and visible 
commitment to a certain corporate culture, thus helping to generate efficient 
assortative matching (that is, attracting job applicants who will fit the 
company).94
To return to investor signaling, big increases in CP can convey 
fundamental information not only about the level of future free cash flows, 
but also about systematic decreases in riskiness of future cash flows, thus 
updating the denominator rather than the numerator in the discounted cash 
flow formula.  When projections of cash flows become less risky, insiders 
can make better assessments of their future opportunities and opportunity 
  One implication of these hypotheses is that benefits arising 
from signaling to employees will be more relevant in high-quality labor 
industries, and so in those industries we should expect more CP, all else 
being equal.  Perhaps it is yet another factor explaining the dominance of 
pharmaceutical and technology companies among the largest corporate 
donors. 
 
 92. See, e.g., Sen et al., supra note 45, at 164. 
 93. See generally Greening & Turban, supra note 61. 
 94. The emphases are on credibility and visibility.  Existing signaling-to-employees 
stories do not account adequately for issues such as mimicry; if management can reduce 
labor costs at will simply by denoting certain organizational values, why do we not observe 
every company doing so?  Regarding visibility, for a corporate culture to attract outsiders, it 
needs to be visible to those not experiencing it; hence, there must be some observable 
symbols associated with certain cultures. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial 
Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543 (1982) (discussing the gift-exchange aspect of corporate 
culture); Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations, 
in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235, 255 (Peter Diamond & Hannu 
Vartiainen eds., 2007) (noting that corporate culture plays a role in assortative matching). 
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costs, and can thus better maximize the level of pro-social sacrifices—they 
need less cash buffers.  In this respect, pro-sociality could mitigate 
asymmetric information about changes along the life cycles of 
organizations and managerial reactions to those changes.95
D.  Adding Complexity 
 
After sketching the contours of a basic signaling explanation to corporate 
pro-sociality, I can introduce additional layers of complexity, such as the 
choice between pro-social and wasteful signals, the possibility for errors in 
signaling, and costs from attracting the wrong reaction. 
A necessary condition for costly signaling is that the behavior will be 
costly to the signaler.  But nothing in the model requires the behavior to 
actually benefit others.  The handicap can be pro-social, but it can just as 
well be wasteful (as in conspicuous consumption).  A fuller analysis should 
thus account for conditions under which pro-social signals are more 
effective than wasteful ones.  For example, if receivers have preferences for 
pro-social displays and if such displays receive greater attention (known as 
“broadcast efficiency”), then the signaler should prefer them to wasteful 
handicaps.96  The choice of signals also has policy implications.  Society 
might be better off when corporate signaling is done via pro-social 
handicaps, rather than wasteful ones—think donations versus gold-
embroidered shower curtains.97
It is also important to take fuller account of errors in signaling 
communication.  We have already mentioned that receivers are error-prone 
when perceiving signals in noisy environments.  Signalers can be error-
prone, too.  For example, corporate managers might be overly optimistic.  
When deciding CP levels based on their upwardly biased perception of 
future prospects, managers might “advertise” too much, that is, engage in 
too much CP.
 
98
 
 95. Cf. Gustavo Grullon et al., Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity?, 75 J. 
BUS. 387 (2002) (payout policy as signaling risk); Marc Orlitzky & John D. Benjamin, 
Corporate Social Performance and Firm Risk:  A Meta-analytic Review, 40 BUS. & SOC’Y 
369, 376 (2001); Van Der Laan et al., supra note 
  A bias in forecasting future cash flows erodes the value of 
the signal and at some point the signaling stops being informative.  
Therefore, the corporate context, with its noisy environments and over-
33, at 308 (noting that we need to explore 
the effects of organizational life cycles on CP). 
 96. See Gintis et al., supra note 68, at 112–15.  As applied here, the choice between 
different signals is perhaps where the “delegated philanthropy” consideration kicks in, as 
(only) a second-order influence.  Companies sacrifice profits to signal their ability to procure 
resources, and they do so by being nice, rather than being wasteful, because their audiences 
prefer interacting with nicer companies. 
 97. Cf. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism, 425 NATURE 785, 
789 (2003); Geoffrey F. Miller, The Handicap Principle:  A Missing Piece of Darwin’s 
Puzzle, 19 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 343, 347 (1998) (reviewing ZAHAVI & ZAHAVI, supra 
note 68). 
 98. On managerial over-optimism in general, see J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and 
Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33, 39–40 (2002).  For an analogy from the dividend-
signaling literature, see generally DeAngelo et al., supra note 70. 
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optimistic signalers, necessitates a thorough understanding of the extent of 
errors in signaling. 
Finally, future research could also consider the possibility of another type 
of cost to the signaler—namely, attracting an unintended observer or 
provoking an unintended reaction from target audiences.  Explicit profit 
sacrificing is conspicuous, and conspicuousness can attract predators who 
think that the signaler has too much waste.99
E.  Fit with Evidence 
  Consider activist hedge funds.  
When such predators observe a company increasing its profit sacrificing, 
they may decide to target the company because of the slack it obviously 
possesses.  Regardless of whether activist hedge funds are beneficial to 
overall welfare, incumbent managers usually want to avoid attracting them.  
Indeed, insiders worried about attracting hedge funds could be pushed to 
choose suboptimal signaling levels ex ante.  Future empirical research could 
try to shed light on this speculation by examining, for example, whether 
changes in CP policies attract certain investors. 
The story thus far has been hypotheses-generating rather than 
hypotheses-testing.  Future empirical research could further refine and/or 
discredit the logic suggested here.  In particular, as signaling is being 
judged based on eliciting behavioral responses from receivers, we should 
study stock market reactions to unexpected announcements of big changes 
in CP policy.  Until such systematic data are available, though, we could 
look at the congruence between our theory and patterns already identified, 
to assess the plausibility of benefits arising from signaling.  The signaling-
cash-flows version, for example, predicts a higher level of CP in companies 
and industries where future free cash flows are less readily observable by 
outsiders, free cash is perceived to be good for the company,100
As firm-specific data are scarce, we resort to indications at the industry 
level.  The fact that pharmaceuticals and technology companies are among 
the largest donors is consistent with these predictions.
 and other 
channels for signaling cash flows are blocked or too costly.  Do these 
predictions fit with the patterns observed? 
101
 
 99. See generally Hebets & Papaj, supra note 
  Those companies 
rely relatively heavily on external finance, which is costly for various 
reasons.  Their future cash flows depend on technological and medical 
innovations not easily observable by outsiders, their tangible assets 
contribute little to firm value, and their earnings are more opaque.  Other 
factors necessitate maintaining a relatively large cash buffer:  long gestation 
periods of products (for example, pushing a new drug through the FDA 
70. 
 100. Excess cash could be evaluated positively or negatively by investors.  It depends on 
firm- and industry-related factors, like the relative importance of mitigating risk, preserving 
financial flexibility, or avoiding underinvestment.  It also depends on how investors expect 
this cash to be used by insiders.  Free cash is prone to be turned into private benefits. See 
Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Paradox of Liquidity, 113 Q.J. ECON. 733 
(1998). 
 101. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
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approval stages) and volatility of earnings generate a great need for finance 
before the company’s own cash flows become more verifiable.102
These observations are indicative at best.
  
Uncommitted, internal sources of finance like free cash could thus be 
especially valuable. 
103  What else have we to show 
for the signaling story predictions?  One especially notable empirical 
pattern arising from meta-analyses is that CP—the most discretionary, 
explicit form of profit sacrificing—has a stronger association with financial 
performance than other corporate social performance expenditures.  It is 
difficult to reconcile this pattern with existing theories.  For example, under 
the delegated philanthropy story, corporations are better positioned to cater 
to charitable preferences only when good deeds are intertwined with 
production, and so operational profit sacrificing should be associated with 
profits more strongly than CP.104  Similarly, under the managerial utility 
explanation, the most discretionary expenditure is supposed to be the most 
susceptible to managerial abuse, and so CP is expected to be less strongly 
associated with good financial performance.105
The signaling story, by contrast, fits this empirical pattern.  A signal has 
to be clearly communicated, quantifiable, and perceived to be handicapping 
with few intrinsic benefits.  Cash donations are more effective signals than 
operational profit-sacrifices; they are more easily communicated and 
quantifiable to outsiders.  Moreover, the fact that they benefit unrelated 
third parties (i.e., are more explicit sacrifices) means that they are perceived 
as greater handicaps than operational sacrifices. 
 
Another puzzling empirical pattern is the dominance of cash over in-kind 
donations.  Traditional profit-enhancing theories predict that in-kind 
donations would yield better results than cash donations in terms of tax 
advantages, better bundling of warm glow with intrinsic utility, and 
stronger consumer preferences.106  Yet the opposite is observed:  cash 
donations generate better reputational payoffs.107  Why?  This Article 
proposes that some of the value enhancement comes from signaling:  cash 
donations are more effective signals because they are easily observable and 
less open to interpretation.108
 
 102. Indeed, Brown et al., supra note 
 
21, at 867, mention volatility of earnings as one of 
the predictors of industry variance in CP.  On the relatively greater dependency on external 
capital in those industries, compare Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial 
Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559, 566 tbl.1 (1998). 
 103. The facts can also be explained through non-signaling stories.  For example, tax laws 
favor product donations by the technology and pharmaceutical industries. See Sugin, supra 
note 44, at 157. 
 104. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 105. Cf. Myers & Rajan, supra note 100 (noting that free cash is more susceptible to 
managerial abuse). 
 106. See Sugin, supra note 44, at 156–57 (noting tax advantages); supra note 44 and 
accompanying text (noting consumer preferences). 
 107. See, e.g., Stephen Brammer & Andrew Millington, Corporate Reputation and 
Philanthropy:  An Empirical Analysis, 61 J. BUS. ETHICS 29 (2005) (a UK study). 
 108. One could claim that managers choose cash over product donations because it allows 
them to reap private benefits more effectively, compare Bartkus et al., supra note 21, at 329, 
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Importantly, these patterns do not provide conclusive evidence in favor 
of the signaling story.  Causation between CP and corporate financial 
performance is more complex, and alternative explanations also fit these 
empirical patterns.  Yet those patterns are indications that existing theories 
do not fully capture the drivers and consequences of CP, and that pursuing 
the signaling angle could lead to a more comprehensive account.109  
Furthermore, I do not suggest that by simply raising their pro-sociality, 
firms can compel outsiders to immediately upgrade their evaluations of the 
firm.  As with dividends and other corporate signaling mechanisms, pro-
sociality is probably only a “‘punctuation mark’ at the end of the 
sentence”110
III.  CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AS A CO-OPTATION MECHANISM 
:  if companies are doing well financially and communicating 
well by other means (for example, managerial forecasts), then an increase in 
pro-sociality can add an extra punch to the message delivered.  My 
argument is thus modest:  among other benefits stemming from pro-
sociality, big changes in donations might also increase the probability that 
outsiders will perceive a firm’s fundamentals to be better than they 
previously thought. 
The previous part sought a better understanding of the positive side of 
CP:  how CP is good for the company.  This part seeks a better 
understanding of the negative side:  how CP can also be bad for the 
company.  It is generally accepted that pro-social profit sacrificing is driven 
to some extent by managerial utility considerations.  The debate is over the 
extent to which those considerations drive it and the implications.  Yet, both 
sides of the debate often downplay an important distinction that this part 
emphasizes:  the distinction between profit-sacrificing expenditures that 
merely reflect agency costs, and those that actually generate more agency 
costs. 
The basic logic here is intuitive.  If managers enjoy wide discretion to 
sacrifice profits and can use this discretion to further their own interests, 
then they can also use it to entrench themselves and weaken the 
mechanisms that monitor them, generating more agency costs.111
 
but such an argument does not explain why cash donations yield better reputational payoffs 
for the company. 
  The 
 109. A general clarification:  the signaling explanation is not meant to be exhaustive.  CP 
behavior cannot be explained under a single theory.  These are context-sensitive decisions, 
influenced also by individuals’ values.  CP policies can simultaneously contain agency 
problems, buying goodwill, and costly signaling aspects.  Theories of CP should thus be 
conditional, not general.  Moreover, given the dynamic character of corporate signaling, any 
signaling explanation might become anachronistic, fit only to describe the historical 
evolution.  For example, the recent trend of managers voluntarily issuing cash flow forecasts 
could reduce the need to use costly signals to convey cash flow information. See generally 
Charles E. Wasley & Joanna Shuang Wu, Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow 
Forecasts?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 389 (2006).  We thus need to consistently reevaluate the fit of 
evidence with the signaling theory predictions. 
 110. Cf. Brav et al., supra note 71, at 512. 
 111. An implicit assumption here is that markets are somewhat limited in constraining 
managers. 
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question, then, is not whether managers can abuse CP in such ways, but 
rather whether managers want to do so.  Is profit sacrificing really an 
effective means to the supposed end of weakening corporate governance?  
Logic, anecdotal observations, and recent empirical studies suggest several 
reasons to answer this question in the affirmative.  CP money can be used 
by managers as mechanisms to co-opt independent directors, influence 
politicians, and entrench themselves by allying with activist stakeholders. 
Before I begin to explore those mechanisms in detail, let me illustrate the 
distinction between problem-reflecting and problem-generating CP with 
two infamous cases, Occidental Petroleum Co. (Oxy) and Enron.  Oxy 
donated more than $85 million (a third of its annual profits) to a museum 
named after Armand Hammer, its soon-to-retire CEO.  Enron was much 
more modest; the company donated between $1 and $2 million to a medical 
center headed by a member of the board audit committee, and several 
hundred thousand to a think tank that employed another independent 
director.112
But is it really more problematic?  In Oxy’s case, the donation was 
disclosed, as the amount was material enough to mandate disclosure under 
the securities laws.
  Usually, agency explanations of CP lump both instances 
together.  In both cases, decision makers used discretion over corporate 
profit-sacrificing money to satisfy the preferences of top management.  
Seen from this angle, the Oxy case is much more detrimental to company 
and shareholder interests simply because the sacrifice is larger. 
113  No adverse impact on stock prices was observed 
when the sacrifice was announced,114
By contrast, Enron consistently pursued a CP policy that undermined the 
checks and balances on corporate governance.  Perhaps not surprisingly, its 
donations were not disclosed.  The direct hit to the financial bottom line 
from those donations was insignificant, but what mattered more than the 
levels of the donations were the targets of the donations.  The choice of 
targets made it somewhat less likely that the CEO would be asked tough 
questions later.  In my view, these latter types of donations represent a 
corporate governance problem justifying legal intervention even more than 
the former type of pure self-aggrandizement. 
 perhaps because the market already 
anticipated that Armand Hammer controlled the board and could pass 
decisions on whatever other types of profit sacrificing that he pleased.  
Arguably, no agency costs were created because of this donation; it only 
reflected existing agency costs. 
To understand why this distinction is not trivial, it is important to 
understand the generic “fixed appropriation” objection to critical agency 
 
 112. See generally Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (containing an analysis of 
the Oxy CP decision); Stuart L. Gillan & John D. Martin, Financial Engineering, Corporate 
Governance, and the Collapse of Enron 49 tbl.6 (Univ. of Del. Coll. of Bus. & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 2002-001, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=354040 (listing examples of Enron’s CP policy). 
 113. Disclosure of the donation likely would have occurred in any event, as building a 
museum in your name is not something you could or would want to hide. 
 114. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office:  A Reappraisal of 
Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 990 n.161 (1999). 
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costs accounts of CP.  One could argue that managerial discretion to engage 
in CP, even when translated into value diversion (for example, pet 
charities), does not really hurt shareholders.  The key assumption in such an 
argument is that managerial discretion is capped by market and/or 
contractual mechanisms, such that increased use of discretion to sacrifice 
profits pro-socially will come at the expense of other managerial 
expenditures, such as executive pay and perks.  Any benefits that managers 
achieve through CP will offset other forms of managerial appropriation.115  
The fixed appropriation argument is assailable:  compensating managers 
with discretion over CP is ineffective; value diversion is not really neutral 
because it generates perverse effects on managerial efforts (incentives); and 
allowing additional channels for value diversion increases managerial 
agency costs, because more channels for appropriation increase the 
difficulty of tracking and capping managerial abuse.116
This Article emphasizes a different rebuttal:  managerial discretion in an 
unregulated channel like CP can be used to co-opt those in charge of 
monitoring.  Like the previous rebuttals, my argument challenges the 
assumption that agency costs are capped regardless of the value diversion 
method.  Unlike the previous rebuttals, my argument stresses that monitors 
will find it more difficult subjectively (not only objectively) to cap 
managerial agency costs when also having to track the unregulated CP 
channel, because monitors will be reluctant to constrain managers when the 
latter donate to the monitors’ preferred charities. 
 
There are three channels through which CP can generate agency costs.  
First, there is a possibility that CP money will be used to co-opt board 
independence.  This possibility was mentioned in the legal literature when 
alluding to Enron’s paradigmatic case,117 but this pattern is not limited to 
Enron.  Look to other post-mortem analyses of failed governance 
mechanisms and you are likely to find that one of the tactics top 
management used to co-opt the board is donations to independent directors’ 
pet charities.  Ross Johnson did it at RJR Nabisco,118 Conrad Black at 
Hollinger,119 and Dennis Kozlowski at Tyco,120
 
 115. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 
 to name but a few.  To be 
3, at 835–39. 
 116. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and 
Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 487 (1999); David I. Walker, The Manager’s 
Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587 (2005); Symposium, supra note 53, at 1321.  It was 
also pointed out that the view of CP as merely another form of executive compensation does 
not fit with current laws.  CP is not subject to the same tax and disclosure laws as executive 
compensation. See id. at 1327 (discussing disclosure obligations).  I can add anecdotally that 
such a concept is also inconsistent with practice; a leading executive compensation attorney 
noted that his clients do not consider the level of discretion over pro-social expenditures 
when negotiating their pay. Interview with Joseph Bachelder, Founder and Senior Partner, 
Bachelder Law Firm, in Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 2008). 
 117. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, On Sacrificing Profits in the Public Interest, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 88, 96–97 (Bruce 
L. Hay et al. eds., 2005). 
 118. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 82, 97 (1990). 
 119. See REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS OF HOLLINGER INTERNATIONAL INC. 409–25 (Aug. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/868512/000095012304010413/y01437exv99w2.
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sure, abuse of CP was not the main cause of corporate governance failures 
in those companies.  But even a minor contribution to such colossal 
governance failures may be important enough to justify consideration by 
policy makers. 
Critics could suggest that these are only anecdotes, and that there is no 
systematic evidence showing that such misuses of CP are meaningful 
enough to merit attention.  Still, we cannot expect to find systematic 
evidence of abuses when no mandatory disclosure is required.  Insiders will 
not voluntarily disclose such details, and so the dirty laundry will be aired 
in public only when post-mortem investigations generate access to the 
company’s books.121  As board independence increasingly becomes a 
governance panacea, the attractiveness of CP as an implicit channel to 
influence directors without losing their “independent” tag will probably 
only increase.122
A second mechanism that makes CP a corporate governance issue is the 
use of money designated as CP to influence politics.  The ability and 
willingness of corporations to use CP in politics is especially relevant 
today.  In the aftermath of the Citizens United v. FEC
 
123 decision, there has 
been a lively discussion in Congress, the SEC, and legal academia on the 
need to introduce protective mechanisms for explicit political spending.  
Not enough attention, however, has been directed to the possibility of 
bypassing protective mechanisms through corporate donations to tax-
exempt “charitable” organizations that serve as conduits for political 
influence; that is, implicit political spending.  CP is relatively unregulated, 
so managers have incentives to couch political spending as CP in order to 
evade restrictions on explicit political donations.  The means exist to 
effectuate this managerial will.  While I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) non-profit 
organizations may not legally engage in political activity, there is ample 
room to characterize political activity as “educational,” thus maintaining an 
organization’s tax-exempt status.  Two notable ways to engage in 
politicized CP are:  first, funding think-tanks that qualify as educational 
organizations while de facto supporting very specific policies or politicians; 
and second, supporting classic advocacy organizations (also known as 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations) with CP money, through the “c3/c4 split” (i.e., 
lobbying organizations establishing a complementary tax-exempt entity that 
is heavily funded by corporations).124
 
htm.  The report accuses Black of two categories of misuse of CP:  as self-aggrandizement, 
for example, by attributing company donations to himself, thus usurping public credit, see id. 
at 415 tbl.14; and as a co-optation device, for example, by donating to independent directors’ 
pet charities, see id. at 419 tbl.15. 
 
 120. Michael J. Bohnen & David M. Phillips, Corporate Gifts Should Be Disclosed, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 21, 2002, at 39. 
 121. Compare Blair, supra note 50, at 45–47 (reports of managerial abuse are isolated 
anecdotes), with Barnard, supra note 17, at 1163–64 (reports are “illustrative of [a] dark 
side”). 
 122. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 57, at 29. 
 123. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 124. For a detailed analysis of the distinction between explicit and implicit political 
influence, see Frances R. Hill, Corporate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance:  Exempt 
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Such uses of CP money are obviously an issue for campaign finance 
laws, but they might also be a corporate governance problem.  To be sure, 
political donations are not necessarily bad for shareholders.  If insiders use 
their clout over politicians to further favorable policies, then shareholders 
may actually value the purchase of political clout with CP money.125  The 
point here is that political donations can also be used to further narrow, 
managerial interests, such as lowering investor protection.126   
Consider the case of managerial lobbying for corporate laws that are not 
necessarily in shareholders’ interests:  anti-takeover legislation.  The legal 
literature took note of the influence managers had in pushing for those laws, 
but it ignored how managers influenced politics, particularly the role CP 
played as part of the “influence technology” of managers.  For example, 
when Dayton Hudson, a Minnesota corporation, became a target for 
takeover in 1987, the managers convinced the state to hold a special 
legislative session where the company’s charitable record was used as 
consideration for enacting a new anti-takeover bill.127  More generally, 
funding certain think tanks and indirectly funding lobbying organizations 
translate into promoting management-friendly laws, such as hurdles on 
shareholder litigation and lobbying against increased transparency 
requirements and shareholder involvement.  Indeed, a recent empirical 
study found that explicit political spending affects shareholder value 
negatively.128  Perhaps implicit political spending, via CP that is done 
without public scrutiny, is at least as detrimental to shareholders. 
A third, less intuitive use of CP to generate further agency costs is as a 
subtle anti-takeover mechanism.  This argument was recently made 
 
Organizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 908–11, 922 
n.197, 928 (1997).  For detailed examples of politicized CP, see Kahn, supra note 55, at 
636–62.  For a theoretical account, see generally STEVEN R. NEIHEISEL, CORPORATE 
STRATEGY AND THE POLITICS OF GOODWILL (1994).  For examples of lobbying organizations 
that are heavily funded by corporate donations, see Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 93–
95. 
 125. Indeed, one could cite evidence that firms in regulated industries give more to 
support claims that politicized CP is profit-driven. See Brown et al., supra note 21, at 872.  
From the point of view of diversified shareholders, however, corporate rent-seeking is not 
necessarily good; it might simply redistribute wealth from one company to another with 
deadweight losses. Cf. Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, 
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2002). 
 126. There is no evidence suggesting that such misuses take place on a meaningful level, 
as is perhaps expected given the lack of a disclosure requirement, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this is a real possibility worthy of further research. 
 127. On managerial-driven anti-takeover legislation, including the Dayton Hudson 
example, see MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS ch. 10 (1994).  For an 
elaborate discussion on the role that Dayton Hudson’s CP policy played in influencing the 
legislation, see HARVARD BUS. SCH. CASE STUDY NO. 9-391-403, DAYTON HUDSON 
CORPORATION:  CONSCIENCE AND CONTROL (A, B, C) (1990).  See other examples at Faith 
Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC:  Reflections on Silence and Power in 
Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107, 1140 n.126 (1997) [hereinafter 
Kahn, Reflections]; Kahn, supra note 55, at 633–34. 
 128. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity:  What 
Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? (Harvard Law and Econ. 
Discussion Paper No. 684, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680861. 
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regarding corporate social responsibility in general.  Managers invest 
strategically in profit sacrificing in order to gain support from activists, 
such as consumer groups or public pension funds.  Those activists are then 
expected to return the favor by reducing the probability of CEO turnover.  
Even if a potential raider can increase a company’s value, activist 
stakeholders will have incentives to keep incumbent managers in place, as 
long as incumbents credibly commit to continue investing in specific social 
or environmental issues.  Activists can use non-conventional “voice” 
mechanisms—mounting a media campaign, threatening boycotts, or using 
their political clout—to support incumbents and fend off takeovers.  Initial 
empirical evidence lends support to the pro-sociality as entrenchment 
hypothesis.129
For purposes of this Article, the question is whether sacrificing profits to 
gain personal favor with activists applies not only to operational profit 
sacrificing but also to CP.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that it does.  In the 
Minnesota anti-takeover bill, for example, Dayton Hudson’s CP policy was 
not merely touted as valuable; the incumbents also called upon the 
company’s grantees—apparently key players in the state—to help promote 
managerial lobbying efforts.
 
130  More generally, the question is:  can 
incumbents commit to a specific CP policy that is favored by activists better 
than insurgents can?131  If the answer is yes, then CP can reduce CEO 
turnover to a suboptimal level, and the case for legal intervention in CP is 
thereby strengthened.132  Possible mechanisms to credibly commit to 
specific CP policies include sitting on boards of specific NGOs, or getting 
highly involved in the social circles of NGO leaders.133
Viewed as a co-optation mechanism and not merely a managerial perk, 
CP can explain why firms with independent boards donate more.
 
134
 
 129. See generally Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta Cestone, Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Managerial Entrenchment, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 741 (2007) (setting a 
model); Surroca & Tribó, supra note 
  If 
profit sacrificing is a managerial perk, then arguably managers who are 
monitored by independent boards should engage in it less.  But if CP is not 
only self-aggrandizing but also entrenching, then managerial-driven CP 
should only increase when internal governance is stronger (for example, 
when boards are more independent).  Under a greater internal threat to their 
22 (empirical testing of the model). But cf. Annita 
Florou, Discussion of Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance, 35 J. 
BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 790, 791–92 (2008) (noting that limitations and directions future research 
will need to explore in order to increase the applicability of said empirical tests). 
 130. See JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, LOOKING GOOD AND DOING GOOD:  CORPORATE 
PHILANTHROPY AND CORPORATE POWER 129 (1997). 
 131. While it might be intuitive to think that incumbents can make manager-specific 
investments in operational pro-sociality that make them valuable for stakeholders (for 
example, specializing in a particular green mode of production), it is less clear how 
managers can commit to being “better” at CP than those who want to replace them. 
 132. See infra Part IV. 
 133. As was indeed the case in the Twin Cities. Cf. Joseph Galaskiewicz, An Urban 
Grants Economy Revisited:  Corporate Charitable Contributions in the Twin Cities, 1979-
81, 1987-89, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 445 (1997). 
 134. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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authority, managers need to invest more in maintaining influence (a 
demand-side explanation).  Unregulated managerial discretion over pro-
social expenditures is therefore more likely to be used in such contexts as 
another tool to influence key players, whose support managers need more 
when threatened from within. 
Indeed, a recent study found that managerial entrenchment is positively 
correlated with corporate social performance levels and that this effect is 
more strongly pronounced when the internal governance mechanisms (such 
as board monitoring) are strong.135  This pattern suggests that managers 
who need to use explicit anti-takeover measures to fend off external 
governance threats also use pro-sociality as implicit anti-takeover measures 
to fend off internal governance threats.136  While more robust evidence is 
needed on the potential channels for managers to use profit sacrificing to 
relax constraints, it seems that there is already enough to raise concerns and 
necessitate a rethinking of the legal implications. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR DISCLOSURE 
A.  The Current Legal Landscape 
The current legal control of CP has been reviewed extensively 
elsewhere.137  This section summarizes legal regulation of CP, with 
subsequent sections more fully evaluating current and proposed laws. 
Every state has a statute explicitly granting corporations the power to 
engage in CP.138  But such statutes provide little guidance.  How do we 
determine whether this power is exercised properly?  The common law 
answer evolved in a way that allows wide discretion for managers in 
making CP decisions.139  The courts suppose that donations are done with 
some long-term benefit for the company in mind.140  As no direct benefit is 
required, managers can practically always justify profit sacrifices by 
alluding to some indirect benefit.  The only constraint on CP in Delaware 
law is that the donation should be reasonable.  “Reasonable” is interpreted 
extremely broadly; as long as the donation meets the criteria for tax 
deduction, it will not be questioned.141 
This brings us to tax law’s treatment of CP.  I.R.C. § 170 allows a tax 
deduction for CP, effectively reducing its costs at the rate of the top 
marginal income tax of the company.  Donations qualify for deduction 
under § 170 as long as they meet three criteria:  they must be no bigger than 
 
 135. See Surroca & Tribó, supra note 22, at 748–49. 
 136. See generally Maretno A. Harjoto & Hoje Jo, Corporate Governance and CSR 
Nexus, 100 J. BUS. ETHICS 45 (2011) (analyzing the association between entrenchment 
indices and corporate social performance); Surroca & Tribó, supra note 22. 
 137. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 3; Kahn, supra note 55. 
 138. See Elhauge, supra note 3, at 867–68. 
 139. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v. 
Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 
(N.J. 1953); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 398 (Utah 1958). 
 140. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg., 98 A.2d at 590. 
 141. See Theodora Holding Corp., 257 A.2d at 405. 
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10 percent of taxable income, made to a recognized 501(c)(3) organization, 
and intended as a “gift,” defined as being made without expectation of quid 
pro quo.142  Essentially, the current legal approach is a hybrid:  corporate 
law authorities allow donations by invoking a long-term benefits 
explanation, while tax authorities allow donations by invoking an altruistic 
explanation. 
Aside from tax laws, CP is not subject to significant federal regulation.  
In particular, CP is not subject to a specific disclosure requirement.  It is not 
captured by the general disclosure criteria either; because donations are 
almost never significant in terms of their size relative to the company’s 
resources, they are not captured by the materiality requirements of the 
securities laws or accounting standards (while expenditures will be reflected 
in the overall balance, they will not be itemized separately in financial 
reports).143  Furthermore, shareholders cannot use their rights of access to 
information to learn about CP.144  Still, there is some limited treatment of 
“interested” donations:  the New York Stock Exchange listing rules demand 
that a listed company that donates over one million dollars to a tax-exempt 
organization affiliated with an independent director must disclose this 
contribution.145  Delaware courts have indirectly addressed this issue as 
well.  When analyzing the independence of special litigation committee 
members, the Delaware Chancery has considered philanthropic ties between 
the company and the CP recipient institution employing the directors.146 
A summary of CP laws would not be complete without alluding to the 
related, timely issue of corporate political donation laws.  Citizens United 
 
 142. Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving:  Tax Expenditures, The Nature 
of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 35–45 
(1994). 
 143. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 114, at 989; Kahn, supra note 55, at 582–83 nn.7–8.  
There are exceptions where CP is counted as part of executive compensation, as in 
“director[s’] legacies” contributions. See id. at 610–11, 624. 
 144. Narrow interpretation of such statutory rights deems them inapplicable for attaining 
CP information. See Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1132–33; Benjamin E. Ladd, 
Note, A Devil Disguised as a Corporate Angel?:  Questioning Corporate Charitable 
Contributions to “Independent” Directors’ Organizations, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2153, 
2187 n.196 (2005). 
 145. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02(b), available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4&manua
l=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F.  Note that this is a watered-down version, an 
exception to the criterion for “independence”:  if a company engages with the director’s 
business organization in a transaction of the magnitude of one million dollars (or 2 percent 
of the organization’s revenues), then the director is no longer considered “independent.”  But 
if similar amounts are being transferred by the company to the director’s charitable 
organization, the director is still considered independent.  The NASDAQ listing rules are 
more stringent in this respect. See Ladd, supra note 144, at 2169–70 (also analyzing the main 
limitations of such regulations, including ineffective enforcement and the possibility of side-
stepping the rules).  For more on the unwillingness of stock exchanges to enforce such 
issues, see Lin, supra note 27, at 29 n.115 and accompanying text.  I have researched NYSE 
filings and have not located a single case of disclosure of such an interested donation.  
Several companies regularly report explicitly that no such donation was made. 
 146. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 932–33 (Del. Ch. 2003).  
While this case signals that courts see CP ties as an issue, without mandatory disclosure the 
possibility to deter interested CP ex ante is limited. See infra Part IV.B. 
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relaxed the historical ban on political donations.147  In the wake of this 
decision, proposals are now before Congress to significantly regulate 
political donations.  The logic is that once historic bans are removed, 
managers cannot be left with unfettered discretion as if political donations 
were ordinary business expenditures; rather, mechanisms need to be put in 
place that will protect shareholders’ interests.148  Thus, the discussion of 
“regular” donations can inform the discussion of explicit corporate political 
spending, and vice versa. 
B.  Evaluating Current and Proposed Laws 
As noted, CP practices exist in a regulatory vacuum.  The laws evolved 
to grant wide discretion to sacrifice profits pro-socially, without affording 
investors the means to control this discretion, such as by mandatory 
disclosure.149  In this section, I build on my analysis in previous parts to 
assess the fit between the observed and the theoretically optimal modes of 
regulating CP. 
What can we learn from the previous discussion?  Part I analyzed the 
complexities of CP and the incomplete empirical picture of corporate 
giving.  Despite these mixed results, there are still some relevant general 
implications.  We can conclude that there is no financial penalty for CP.  A 
blanket legal ban on all CP expenditures cannot be justified on economic 
grounds.  If CP is indeed value-enhancing, then there is little reason to 
intervene in the name of corporate governance.  Yet, we also know that CP 
is not just value-driven.  The logic of incentives and the evidence (once 
purely anecdotal, but now more systematic) suggest that managerial 
discretion can be used, under certain circumstances, to benefit managers at 
shareholders’ expense.  Such indications suggest that while a total ban is 
unwarranted, we also cannot afford to ignore CP completely.  Those 
opposing legal intervention frequently respond that, while some donations 
are indeed about managerial self-aggrandizement at the expense of 
shareholders, those are only isolated cases of relatively small magnitude 
that do not merit intervention. 
My analysis in Part III sheds light on the problems that arise from 
continuing to ignore CP.  First, we should not be quick to dismiss anecdotal 
evidence of abuse as merely anecdotes; CP is currently not subject to 
disclosure, so the scope of the phenomenon might be more alarming than 
we are allowed to observe.  Second, even relatively small amounts of 
managerial-driven CP, which are not troubling by themselves, can serve as 
early warnings of suboptimal diversion of corporate resources by managers 
for their own interests.150  The result is that disclosure of CP might have 
spillover benefits that go beyond direct effects of the donations on the 
bottom line.  Third, in the subset of cases in which managerial-driven CP 
 
 147. See 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 148. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1146. 
 150. See Barnard, supra note 17, at 1174–77. 
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not only reflects existing agency costs but also generates additional agency 
costs, the case for legal intervention is much stronger.  Failure to address 
agency problems in CP decisions might make it more difficult to address 
agency problems in other corporate decisions.151 
But saying that something must be done just begins the analysis.  The 
question is what exactly to do.  We need to make a preliminary choice 
between two basic options:  either we try to target and ban those CP 
decisions that are bad for the company and allow all others, or else we 
refrain from direct interference with CP decisions and rather supply 
protective mechanisms that will facilitate market control.  This is where the 
discussion on the value-enhancing aspects of CP in Part II can help.  It 
highlights the futility of trying to distinguish bad from good—that is, profit-
enhancing from profit-reducing donations.  Shareholders and courts are 
unable to eliminate bad CP decisions based on the existence of clear signs 
of quid pro quo, or professed insiders’ motivations.  The asymmetric 
information angle suggests that profit sacrificing may still be value-
enhancing.152  It thus strengthens the argument that targeted bans are 
impractical and unwarranted—another reason for us to leave profit-
sacrificing discretion to managers, and to focus instead on less intrusive 
protective mechanisms.  The following sections evaluate two such options, 
requiring disclosure and mandating shareholder involvement. 
1.  Requiring Disclosure? 
The lack of any substantive disclosure requirement has not gone 
unnoticed or unquestioned.  Proposals for legislation have been brought up 
frequently in Congress and the corporate and securities law literature over 
the past fifteen years.153  A fairly common denominator in those proposals 
is the call for two types of disclosure:  targeted disclosure of “interested” 
donations to NGOs affiliated with directors, and general disclosure both of 
total amounts given yearly and of beneficiaries receiving sums over a 
certain threshold.  Yet those proposals, even the modest ones, never made it 
into law.  For example, the House of Representatives version of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act contained a CP-disclosure requirement, but it was 
omitted from the final Act.154  Below we try to assess whether this is 
justified. 
 
 151. Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 91 (in the context of political donations). 
 152. The benefits from signaling will outweigh agency costs from managerial utility-
driven donations only when the weight placed on the short-run improvement—generated by 
the elicited response of outsiders updating their valuation—outweighs any extra surplus 
captured by the manager. 
 153. See the representative proposal in H.R. 3745, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002), which 
was later duplicated in subsequent Congresses. See also Barnard, supra note 17, at 1169–70; 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct that Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain:  
Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Sheep’s Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1, 22–25 (1998); 
Kahn, supra note 55; Richard W. Painter, Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1219, 1228 (2002). 
 154. See H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 7 (2d Sess. 2002). 
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The pros of requiring CP disclosure are intuitive.  Firms cannot be 
expected to voluntarily provide sufficient and comparable information on 
their pro-social activities, due to agency and coordination problems.155  
First, when left on their own, insiders will have incentives to provide biased 
disclosure, whether by exaggerating the positive aspects of donations or by 
camouflaging the negative aspects.  Mandatory disclosure could serve as an 
early warning by flushing out cases of self-aggrandizement, as well as 
reducing the ability of managers to use CP as a co-optation device to bypass 
existing restrictions on board independence, political spending, or anti-
takeover measures.156  Second, mandatory disclosure would standardize 
both the form and the substance of the information, thereby allowing 
comparability and increasing the value of information to outsiders. 
Commentators direct less attention to the cons of mandatory CP 
disclosure.  The legislative history of proposed bills reveals a basic set of 
three recurring arguments against disclosure:  (1) the costs of implementing 
disclosure; (2) the negative impact of an expected chilling effect on overall 
CP; and (3) the marginal benefits of regulated disclosure—the relevant 
information is already public and/or no one is interested in it.157 
The first argument invokes several types of disclosure costs:  actual 
costs, like compiling and disseminating data, and indirect costs, like 
overwhelming investors (that is, additional information dilutes the value of 
existing information).  Those arguments may hold on paper, but in practice, 
introducing a new disclosure requirement will not add significantly to the 
mix of costs already incurred.  Firms are required to report the levels and 
targets of certain donations to the IRS, so no compiling costs would be 
added.158  Since large firms disseminate information about their pro-social 
behavior to the public via company websites and separate, lengthy 
corporate social responsibility reports (CSR reports),159 no disseminating 
costs will be added either.  Finally, acknowledging this steady flow of 
social responsibility information discredits the “overwhelming investors 
with information” argument as well.  On the contrary, because the mass of 
public information is presented in a distorted, non-standardized, and non-
 
 155. Cf. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 278–79 (2d ed. 
2009). 
 156. Such an argument stresses the role of mandatory disclosure in reducing agency costs 
(not just the accurate pricing-enhancement role). See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory 
Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995). 
 157. See, e.g., Increasing Disclosure to Benefit Investors, supra note 87. 
 158. See Kahn, supra note 55, at 586 n.20.  A stronger version of this argument would 
object to the targeted disclosure proposed, claiming that companies are not able to 
continuously keep an eye on which NGO boards the officers are currently sitting.  But 
officers already provide extensive disclosure of various affiliations, so this could hardly be 
counted as a significant added cost of disclosure.  Moreover, such an objection does not hold 
against the proposed general disclosure requirement (disclosing overall amount and large 
individual donations). 
 159. On the prevalence of CSR reports among large companies, see, for example, KPMG, 
International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 13–20 (2008), 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Interna
tional-corporate-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf; see also Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, 
at 1143 (for a similar argument on the low costs of disseminating online). 
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transparent manner (anecdotes instead of comparable numbers, forcing 
readers to wind through the maze of long CSR reports),160 any requirement 
that companies publicize a standardized and concise form, such as a single 
number of overall donations, will not muddy the waters but rather 
crystallize them. 
It is more difficult to dismiss the second “chilling effect” argument 
because of its abstract nature.  Without previous experience with mandatory 
CP disclosure, we have no evidence of the consequences of disclosure.  
Those concerned about a potential chilling effect rest their criticism on two 
assumptions.  First, that disclosure will decrease overall CP, and second, 
that benefits to shareholders from deterrence of bad CP decisions will be 
dwarfed by the negative impact on the non-profit sector.  These 
assumptions are supported by neither logic nor evidence. 
To understand why, consider the different categories and motivations of 
CP.  Donations motivated by buying goodwill or signaling are not likely to 
be deterred by disclosure.  Currently, information about corporate pro-
sociality exists in an environment where virtually all companies profess to 
be nice and disseminate long and anecdotal CSR reports.  In this 
environment, companies can easily exaggerate their goodness because a 
threat of legal liability for exaggeration is extremely remote.  A threat of 
market sanction is also very limited since information on pro-sociality is not 
readily verifiable.161  Companies that actually invest heavily in pro-sociality 
find it hard to distinguish themselves from those who merely pretend to be 
generous.  This cheap talk environment leads outsiders to discount 
information about corporate pro-sociality, and leads insiders to invest in 
marketing rather than actual philanthropic impact.  In other words, pro-
social activities are picked for their window-dressing value. 
Regulated disclosure could lead to less cacophony, and less cacophony 
could lead to more incentives to engage in meaningful pro-social profit 
sacrificing.  Disclosure would thus not decrease CP.  To the contrary, it 
would likely increase both doing good, because incentives to exaggerate 
goodness will decrease, and doing well, because outsiders are likely to be 
better informed about corporate goodness. 
The next step in evaluating the chilling effect argument is to consider the 
effect on bad, managerial utility-driven CP.  Here, it is more intuitive to 
speculate that disclosure would indeed decrease donations, and the question 
is whether this is a good thing for society.  Proponents of the chilling 
argument could claim that the loss to the non-profit sector from decreased 
funds outweighs shareholder gains from decreased perk-like donations 
 
 160. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  Considerations of overwhelming 
investors do not eliminate the need for standardized disclosure.  At most, they point to 
directions for designing the disclosure requirement. 
 161. On the lack of implicit assurance via litigation threats for non-financial reporting (as 
opposed to financial reporting), see Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., Voluntary Non-financial 
Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital:  The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reporting 9–10 (Feb. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1343453. 
1930 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
because shareholder gains are supposed to be nominal.  Managers will 
simply substitute this discretionary expenditure for another (for example, 
move from CP to ineffective operational profit sacrificing or traditional 
perks).  As Part III clarifies, however, this neutral-value-diversion argument 
ignores the possibility that CP is not only self-aggrandizing, but also 
potentially co-opting.  Co-opting donations have the effect of bypassing 
existing restrictions and are thus ones that society (and probably also 
shareholders as a group) wants to deter.162  The only category in which the 
chilling argument’s assumptions might hold is that of CP decisions driven 
by managerial self-aggrandizement. 
But even with self-aggrandizing donations, both assumptions on which 
the chilling effect argument rests are shaky.  It is not clear that disclosure 
would decrease self-aggrandizing donations.  If the point behind them is to 
bolster managers’ images or intrinsic benefits, then perhaps disclosure 
would trigger a race among managers to be perceived as the biggest donor, 
a “ratcheting-up” effect where no CEO wants to be seen as below-average 
in pro-social engagement.  After all, this was the result of introducing new 
disclosure requirements in related areas such as managerial perks.163  
Furthermore, even if disclosure would somewhat decrease self-aggrandizing 
donations, it is not clear that the losses to the non-profit sector outweigh all 
the other benefits.164 
Across all different categories of CP, the chilling argument’s two 
assumptions do not hold:  disclosure is unlikely to decrease donations that 
do good, and it enables doing well; the only donations it is likely to 
decrease are those that do bad.  In any case, even if the effects of disclosure 
 
 162. There is a general argument in favor of CP disclosure, which goes beyond corporate 
and securities law considerations.  We have already discussed election law justifications for 
CP disclosure.  Another notable example is the perverse effects pharmaceutical CP can have 
on medical care, recently addressed by the Sunshine Act. See Rick Cohen, Shenanigans of 
Corporate Grantmaking, NONPROFIT Q. (Jan. 31, 2008), 
http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=288:sh
enanigans-of-corporate-grantmaking&catid=149:rick-cohen&Itemid=991.  The upshot is 
that instead of putting a finger in the dike whenever perverse effects of CP abuse are being 
detected ex post in one context or another, we should increase transparency of profit-
sacrificing activities altogether. 
 163. See Yaniv Grinstein et al., The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure 17–18 
(Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series No. 06-2011, Apr. 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108707.  To be sure, one can claim that 
a ratcheting-up competition for more profit sacrificing would be a bad thing for shareholders 
and perhaps even for overall welfare.  But I raise my argument as a rebuttal against the 
assumption of disclosure opponents, according to which disclosure of discretionary 
resources necessarily leads to fewer expenditures.  One could argue that in CP, unlike in 
executive pay or perks, it is less likely that disclosure would lead to ratcheting up because 
there are fewer incentives for insiders to keep engaging in the disclosed activity when facing 
increased market or social control.  The level of private benefits for every dollar spent on CP 
is probably lower than the private benefits from every dollar spent on perks, not to mention 
on direct salary.  Whether we subscribe to this prediction or not depends on our 
understanding of what causes ratcheting-up effects. 
 164. For one, there is an argument in favor of submitting perk-like donations to the same 
disclosure requirements that are applied to traditional perks. 
2012] CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 1931 
on overall levels of CP are uncertain, it is still likely to better align 
corporate pro-sociality with shareholder value. 
The third and final objection to requiring disclosure of CP posits that the 
benefits from introducing disclosure are insignificant and are unlikely to 
outweigh the costs.  Proponents of this objection maintain that investors are 
not interested in information about CP, and those investors who are 
interested can assemble the relevant pieces of public information without 
needing costly regulatory intervention.  In support of this claim, opponents 
of disclosure invoke the relative dearth of shareholder litigation and 
proposals on the matter.165  But all we can really conclude from such 
evidence is that shareholders are not interested in the information currently 
available.  Naturally, the abuse of profit-sacrificing expenditures will not be 
disclosed voluntarily, so shareholders and regulators cannot act upon them 
ex ante.  A more relevant question is whether the managers of Enron and 
RJR Nabisco could have freely used CP as a co-optation device if there had 
been a disclosure requirement in place at the time.166 
The argument that outsiders can already get CP information through 
existing sources is also flawed, if only because it unrealistically assumes a 
competitive market for corporate social responsibility information.  The 
conditions for an “unraveling” effect—where firms voluntarily disclose all 
private information on their pro-sociality for fear that outsiders will assume 
the worst if information is not fully disclosed—do not hold in our 
context.167  For example, misrepresentation is not costly, because 
information is unverifiable and subject to very little legal scrutiny.168  
 
 165. See generally Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127. 
 166. See id. at 1143; see also supra notes 118, 151 and accompanying text.  In general, 
invoking the low number of litigations or shareholder proposals to suggest that disclosure is 
unnecessary ignores how the current legal regime affects the revealed preferences of 
shareholders.  For example, courts have made it clear that challenges to CP decisions are 
bound to be rejected even when the donations are clearly self-aggrandizing and comprise 
one-third of the annual profits; and it was traditionally unclear whether the SEC allows 
shareholders to use the proxy mechanism to bring forth decisions related to the subject. See 
Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1123–24.  All this makes it costly for shareholders to 
challenge CP practices. 
 167. On the conditions for the “unraveling” effect, see Anne Beyer et al., The Financial 
Reporting Environment:  Review of the Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296, 300–15 
(2010); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 682–85 (1984) (discussing the “unraveling” 
effect in securities law). 
 168. Note that the transparency needed also might regard future profit-sacrificing 
behavior, so it would be very difficult to assess the integrity of a manager’s disclosure. Cf. 
Jason Scott Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility:  On the Law and Economics of 
Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance 35, 74 (John F. Kennedy Sch. 
of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Corp. Soc. Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 14, 2005), 
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_14_
johnston.pdf. 
  A similar argument against regulated disclosure could invoke my own signaling 
analysis. See generally Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets:  
Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 177 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979).  If indeed CP brings with it benefits of 
mitigating asymmetric information, then disclosure need not be mandated.  Companies 
wanting to distinguish themselves as high quality will disclose credibly and sufficiently.  But 
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Indeed, while most large companies generate detailed CSR reports, these 
reports achieve no real transparency.169  Social responsibility information 
intermediaries also fail to generate sufficient, credible information, if only 
because they do not enjoy superior access to relevant information.170  In 
any case, sending outsiders to piece together bits of information is 
unrealistic and ineffective; companies are better positioned to supply this 
information in a complete, comparable, and timely manner.171 
The lack of reliable information also answers the generic critique against 
regulatory intervention that shareholders are free to sort their investments 
based on their approval or disapproval of pro-social policies.  It is not only 
that shareholders have many other factors according to which they sort 
companies.  Even if shareholders do want to sort based on CP, they cannot 
do it effectively without mandatory disclosure.  In an uninformative “cheap 
talk” environment, practically all companies profess to be nice, and no 
manager professes to abuse CP money to entrench herself, so outsiders 
cannot distinguish between nice guys and pretenders. 
A common theme in these arguments against disclosure is that they do 
not account enough for how laws affect the baseline.  While corporate pro-
sociality is very much controlled by market forces, the presence of market 
control does not mean that legal control is meaningless, because the 
existing legal regime influences market forces.  Specifically, market control 
relies on information flow, and the law affects how information flows.172  
Against the background of the lack of legal standards governing pro-social 
disclosure, voluntary reports by firms fail to generate transparency.  
Similarly, corporate social responsibility information intermediaries cannot 
be assumed to produce satisfying results on their own without 
standardization of metrics, credible third-party liability threat, or access to 
comparable information.173  Legal control of the flow of information—that 
is, requiring standardized reporting form and substance, and establishing a 
liability threat for falsely communicating or failing to report—could thus be 
beneficial for both shareholders and stakeholders by reducing managerial 
 
even if we assume that meaningful signaling “pressures” are at work (remember that our 
refinements suggested that signaling is rather coarse), then signal selection can be expected 
to operate mostly on the level of donations, and less on the targets.  In our example, outsiders 
pay more attention to how much cash companies dispose of when donating, and less to 
where exactly this cash is being disposed. 
 169. Cf. Porter & Kramer, supra note 29, at 81. 
 170. See Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1142–43 n.131; supra Part I.A.4.  
Moreover, without legal intervention it is less likely that those private intermediaries could 
deter abuse of CP money sufficiently, since their ratings focus more on levels of CP, rather 
than on targets (and it is the choice of targets that generates the ability to use CP as a co-
optation mechanism). 
 171. Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 106. 
 172. See Johnston, supra note 168; see also Lin, supra note 27, at 27. 
 173. After all, the same factors that created a need to regulate the market for financial 
information intermediaries (for example, possible collusion with monitored companies) are 
also likely to operate in the social information intermediaries market.  For example, 
considerations of competition for clients and pressures from interest groups could dictate 
adopting overly wide metrics. See Johnston, supra note 168. 
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agency costs and allowing firms to credibly commit to pro-sociality with 
real impact. 
To be sure, we cannot expect disclosure to be a panacea for all negative 
aspects of CP.  For disclosure to be justified, it must have a real potential to 
induce readers to act on the disclosed information and change the behavior 
of the disclosing entity for the better.174  In our case, for example, it could 
be claimed that the amounts spent are not significant enough to elicit a 
response.175  Another concern is that subjecting this voluntary “charitable” 
practice to a new disclosure requirement would crowd out motivation, and 
tame the practice in the eyes of outsiders and insiders.176 
Yet, we should not overstate these concerns.  For one, disclosure can play 
a role in greasing the wheels of corporate governance even when the 
amounts involved in suspicious transactions are not material by 
themselves.177  Perhaps the best answer to these concerns is to proceed 
cautiously:  first mandate some form of limited disclosure, then gather 
information on the regulations’ effects and CP practices, and finally 
reassess the consequences of regulation and alter it if necessary.178 
A distinct question is why proposals that would require disclosure of CP 
continue to be rejected.  Indeed, we saw that the commonly raised 
objections do not have enough merit to justify the current regulatory 
vacuum.  A full answer to this question would require a separate article, so I 
will only briefly sketch some conjectures based on congressional hearings 
and personal interviews.  Lack of regulation can be attributed to a mixture 
of three main causes.  First, some policymakers still hold the outdated belief 
that pro-social sacrifices are not big enough to merit costly intervention.179  
Second, policymakers are reluctant to be perceived as thwarting 
philanthropy, which is “as American as apple pie,” and so turn a blind eye 
 
 174. See generally Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean:  Perverse Effects 
of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) (noting that disclosing 
conflicts of interest can have perverse effects, such as making the disclosing agent feel 
morally licensed); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:  Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (noting that more 
information is not necessarily better; it depends on whether users can process that 
information effectively). 
 175. Cf. Sugin, supra note 44, at 140 (noting that shareholders “would be unlikely to 
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 176. See generally Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules:  
Expressive Law and CEO Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207 (2008) (requiring enhanced 
disclosure of executive pay will send a message that pay without performance should invite 
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 177. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 155, at 280–81.  Indeed, evidence suggests that 
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to a negative stock price impact far larger than the expenditure itself. See, e.g., Grinstein et 
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to an independent director’s preferred charity, the firm’s stock price fell. Bohnen & Phillips, 
supra note 120, at 39. 
 178. Cf. Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act:  A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 
309–12 (2005). 
 179. See Increasing Disclosure to Benefit Investors, supra note 87. 
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to the supposedly insignificant dangers it brings.180  Third, unsurprisingly, 
there are private interests at play. 
One usual suspect for killing disclosure proposals is the strong 
managerial lobby, whose interest is to protect managers’ unfettered 
discretion.  After all, while both shareholders and stakeholders may fare 
better under mandatory disclosure, managers might fare worse—one covert 
channel for managerial influence on key players will be hampered.181  A 
closer look reveals additional, less intuitive suspects possibly pushing 
against disclosure.  Incumbent politicians who are currently enjoying this 
subtle channel for corporate money have incentives to keep CP in the dark 
in order to evade restrictions on explicit corporate funding.182  More 
interestingly, charitable organizations themselves oppose disclosure 
proposals.  There is a strange divide in the non-profit sector over the matter:  
while some organizations publicly support disclosure, leaders of the 
mainstream foundations and associations are vocal in their resistance.183  
Publicly, they profess their concern that disclosure would yield a chilling 
effect, but perhaps there is a cynical flavor to their opposition; what those 
players care about might not be the level of overall CP, but rather the share 
of CP directed at their own specific non-profits.  They might fear that 
disclosure would hinder their advantage in influencing corporate insiders 
behind closed doors. 
2.  Additional Protective Mechanisms 
In the political donations context, recent calls to mandate protective 
mechanisms other than disclosure focused specifically on mandatory 
shareholder involvement.184  Should this be the case with all donations, not 
just the explicitly political ones?  In the past, legislatures and academics 
 
 180. See the comments made in that spirit by a former SEC chairman, academics, and 
practitioners in Balotti & Hanks, supra note 114, at 991, 996; Richard C. Breeden, Giving It 
Away:  Observations on the Role of the SEC in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Charity, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1997); Symposium, supra note 53, at 1324–25. 
 181. This is similar to arguments made in the CP-as-antitakeover-mechanism articles:  
when requirements of accountability become stronger and more explicit, firms can credibly 
commit to pro-sociality and the importance of a specific incumbent manager’s commitment 
is reduced. See Cespa & Cestone, supra note 129. 
 182. See Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 
34 GA. L. REV. 745, 769 & n.118 (2000). 
 183. See E-mail from Pablo Eisenberg, Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Pub. & Nonprofit 
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 184. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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proposed mandatory shareholder votes on CP.185  These proposals rested on 
the CP model of Warren Buffett’s company, Berkshire Hathaway, where 
management set the levels of CP and shareholders designated the targets.  
But those proposals drew elaborate criticism, and in retrospect Berkshire 
Hathaway’s experiment provides an argument against shareholder 
involvement.  Berkshire Hathaway terminated its CP program when 
subsidiaries of the company were boycotted because shareholders 
designated controversial organizations as beneficiaries.186 
There are additional arguments to explain why a shareholder vote, even if 
justified in the specific context of political donations, is not justified in the 
broader context of CP.  First, consider the impact it would have on the 
bottom line.  Logic and evidence suggest that the choice of targets impacts 
possible benefits accruing to the company from CP.  It is likely that 
managers will be better positioned than dispersed shareholders to identify 
such benefits and act accordingly.187  By contrast, with political donations, 
the benefits are the type that can secure a seat at the table, make sure the 
company is being heard, or promote the politician or policy that is most 
likely to further the corporate interests.  Shareholders are thus more likely 
to be able to designate or approve targets for effective political spending.  
To oversimplify:  in non-political donations, the daunting task is to identify 
which stakeholders prefer what causes, which stakeholders are more 
important to the company at the moment, and which policy will draw 
attention and get attributed to the right motives; in political donations, the 
(less daunting) task is to identify who is in power or who promotes policies 
that favor the company.188 
Second, some claim that in the political donations context, shareholder 
involvement could also mitigate “expressive harms,” that is, reduce the 
costs of being associated with donations to causes opposed to shareholder 
preferences and beliefs.189  While this argument could hold for political 
donations, it is less plausible for CP in general.  Political purposes are 
bound to be polarized and of a zero-sum character, regardless of who is 
making the decision (spending on right-wing causes hurts the expressive 
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166.).  Effective monitoring through being attentive to stock prices is also unlikely here 
because the stock price impact of CP is small. 
 189. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 95–97. 
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interests of those supporting leftist causes).190  In the non-political 
donations context, however, giving shareholders power to designate targets 
can actually be expected to generate more expressive harms.  Evidence 
suggests that manager-designated donations usually steer clear of extreme, 
expressive-ideological, polarized, or religious targets, while those targets 
are exactly the ones favored by shareholders.191  Taking into account 
expressive harms, advocates for this proposal should not push toward a 
shareholder vote.192
I have focused on the impact on shareholders, both financially and 
expressively.  But it could be claimed that one should also consider the 
impact on non-shareholders, such as the non-profit sector.  Shareholder vote 
proponents argue that deferring to shareholder preferences will channel CP 
money toward more diverse social goals and generate more utility from the 
virtuous feelings of donors.
 
193  Yet such arguments are problematic, as has 
been shown elsewhere.194  Notably, they ignore the possibility that giving 
shareholders a say on targets will decrease the overall level of CP:  a 
shareholder vote is likely to decrease the level of profit-enhancing-
motivated donations because managers would not want to risk outraging 
stakeholders with a choice of controversial targets, such as occurred with 
the abrupt termination of CP at Berkshire Hathaway.  A shareholder vote is 
also likely to decrease the level of managerial utility-motivated CP—
managers gain fewer private benefits when they cannot designate targets, 
and are thus likely to drop the percentage of discretionary resources they 
allocate to CP.195
Overall, the corporate governance concerns raised by CP should not be 
overstated.  There are other agency problems more urgent than misuse of 
pro-social discretion.  The legal system does not need to interfere too much 
with existing practices.  At the same time, misuses of CP could be 
indicative of agency problems and, when used in tandem with other co-
optation devices, could generate agency problems.  Introducing a limited 
form of the less restrictive protective mechanism—mandatory disclosure—
may therefore be the best option.  Whatever form of regulation is 
introduced, careful attention has to be paid to its expressive aspects.  
Intervention should be couched as not interfering with voluntary sacrifices 
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 193. See Brudney & Ferrell, supra note 185, at 1207. 
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and not taming corporate pro-sociality, so as not to crowd out motivations 
and erode benefits arising from signaling.196
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article aims at advancing our understanding of corporate pro-
sociality and sketching initial policy implications.  We should focus more 
on informational benefits stemming from corporate profit sacrificing in 
order to understand what outsiders learn when they observe companies 
behaving pro-socially.  We should also keep an eye on how unfettered 
discretion over pro-social expenditures could generate governance 
problems.  Acknowledging both of those oft-unnoticed elements then 
strengthens the case for introducing some form of standardized mandatory 
disclosure. 
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature.  The first 
and primary contribution is shifting the focus of value-enhancing 
explanations of CP from a buying-goodwill approach to a signaling 
approach.  Companies engage in pro-sociality not only because 
stakeholders like that companies are nice, but also because pro-sociality 
sends a favorable message about the company’s fundamentals.  The second 
theoretical contribution is the shift of focus from a “managerial perk 
approach” to a “co-optation approach” to agency costs explanations of CP.  
Managerial self-aggrandizing donations might be problematic, but co-
opting donations are even more detrimental and necessitate legal 
intervention.  The third contribution is to emphasize a shift of focus from a 
traditional “hands-off” approach to the legal implications of CP in order to 
strengthen the case for disclosure. 
These three contributions are based on straightforward intuitions.  First, 
the notion that corporate pro-sociality is signaling is based on the intuition 
that to understand why corporations engage in pro-sociality, one needs to 
understand why anyone behaves pro-socially.197  Signaling plays an 
increasingly important role in explaining individual pro-sociality, and there 
is all the more reason to apply it to the corporate context:  this is a relatively 
competitive, impersonal context, filled with asymmetric information and 
high-powered incentives to cheat in communication.  It is time, therefore, 
that we switch from emotional and cognitive explanations for corporate 
cooperative behavior and focus more on signaling aspects.198
 
 196. Cf. POSNER, supra note 
  Note that I 
am not suggesting that signaling is the sole or even the main driver of CP 
behavior, or that insiders carefully contemplate signaling with CP levels.  
My narrower, and thus more intuitive, point is rather that signaling is one 
unexplored mechanism through which pro-sociality could advance the 
77, at 176 (noting that external intervention can cause 
unintended consequences, such as pushing signalers to signal in a worse way, or to stop 
signaling and therefore lose some of the ability to mitigate asymmetric information). 
 197. See Henderson & Malani, supra note 25, at 572. 
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bottom line.  This intuitive signaling point runs the risk of turning into a 
“just so story,” future research is still needed.  In particular, we should try 
to examine the impact of announcements of major changes in CP policies 
on stock prices. 
Second, the notion that corporate pro-sociality is a co-optation 
mechanism is also based on a simple intuition:  if managers can use 
discretion over pro-social expenditures to generate managerial perks, they 
can also use it to entrench themselves and co-opt the governance 
mechanisms that constrain them.  It is difficult to determine the true scope 
of this corporate governance problem due to the lack of public disclosure:  
it could be minor relative to other agency problems.  Nevertheless, the 
introduction of some form of disclosure could be a reasonable step toward 
deterring such misconduct while bolstering signaling and other benefits 
arising from CP, at relatively little cost. 
Finally, the need to rethink the current hands-off approach to legal 
regulation is also intuitive.  The current approach is based on the 
anachronistic premise that corporate pro-sociality is of little relevance to the 
market.  Nowadays, strong market incentives shape corporate social 
responsibility practices.  The legal system needs to acknowledge the impact 
it has on those market forces and act accordingly.199
CP and corporate pro-sociality in general are complex phenomena, thus I 
omitted several aspects from this Article for the sake of brevity and clarity.  
For example, I did not consider the roles charitable organizations or 
corporate foundations play in altering CP behavior.  Examining the 
beneficiaries of CP, their connections with corporate decision makers, and 
their use of CP money could help us better understand both potential 
agency problems and benefits from signaling.
 
200  Similarly, elaborating on 
donations channeled through corporate foundations could affect analysis; 
giving through foundations tends to be more stable, is reported to the IRS in 
forms accessible to the public, and is ostensibly less susceptible to CEOs’ 
influence.  Those differences matter for all sorts of CP implications—
buying goodwill, signaling information, and generating private benefits.201
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I also did not address all the normative angles.  Suggesting that corporate 
pro-sociality might serve as a signal is not the same as saying that CP is 
beneficial to overall welfare.  Signaling could evolve into a pooling, 
uninformative equilibrium.  A signaling rat-race could lead managers to 
focus on the perceived, instead of the real, impact of their pro-social 
expenditures, or to focus more on how to be perceived as nice instead of on 
the firm’s fundamentals.  Overemphasis on perceived pro-sociality could 
also be used as window-dressing, disguising bigger problems.  For example, 
Enron was a CSR poster child, winning numerous accolades.202  On the 
other hand, signaling with pro-sociality might have a longer-lasting impact 
on society than corporate signaling with other, wasteful means.  Similarly, 
when discussing the expected consequences of disclosure—whether it will 
chill, ratchet up, or not affect CP levels—I did not intend to make a 
statement on the overall desirability of CP, but rather to show that the 
assumptions of the opponents of disclosure are tenuous.  Whatever the 
overall normative implications are,203
The new perspective on corporate pro-sociality provided in this Article 
could also be built upon to develop new understandings in seemingly 
distinct areas of corporate governance literature, in ways that were not 
developed here:  how companies build a reputation toward outsiders, how 
managers instill a corporate culture that facilitates cooperation inside the 
corporation, and how insiders mobilize resources to act in the political 
sphere.  These directions for future research share an underlying theme, 
which is also the basis for this Article:  the corporate governance literature 
has much to gain from a fresh look at corporate pro-sociality. 
 this Article aims to increase 
awareness of the informational aspects of pro-sociality, and the impact a 
given legal regime has on the market for information. 
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